28 AMERICAN SPY
One month later, I learned of successful NATO air and missile attacks on
dozens of BSA positions, including radar and antiaircraft sites, command
centers, and communications facilities, whose locations I had pinpointed in
July. I was heartened that my mission to Sarajevo contributed at least in a
small way to shortening the duration of the cursed war.
Since I’d previously served in Belgrade, where I ran traditional Cold
War “denied area” operations, I was also tasked to perform an operational
survey to determine whether or not the CIA could securely handle agents
inside Sarajevo, using denied area tradecraft. I quickly determined that we
could not handle or meet assets inside Sarajevo, at least not during summer
months. No matter where in Sarajevo you walked or drove, locals were not
on the streets, because of the danger. Sarajevans remained indoors but
typically were hanging out open windows and balconies to relieve boredom
and be cooled by fresh air. It would be almost impossible to meet with
someone on the street without the meeting being observed and reported by
residents, who were already skittish.
Dead drops, which we used successfully in Soviet bloc and other
denied area countries in order to avoid direct contact with agents, would
also be problematic in Sarajevo. A dead drop is a classic means of “imper-
sonal” tradecraft for the exchange of communications and other mate-
rials (money, microfilm, etc.) between agent and handler. For example, an
agent might leave secret documents in a predetermined hollowed-out log
for his handler to retrieve later. “Concealment devices” such as fake rocks
are often used to disguise and protect the secret material. The people of
Sarajevo were literally starving, so even a dead drop inside a rat carcass
risked being retrieved by a hungry resident.
While in Sarajevo, I also covered the Serb capture of UN-declared
“safe areas” Srebrenica and Žepa, which fell during my assignment there.
Madeleine Albright, then US ambassador to the United Nations, was
especially keen to know the number of Bosnians killed. When I reported
that, according to my reliable Bosnian security service sources, between
six thousand and eight thousand Bosnians were slaughtered by the Serbs
during the initial takeover of Srebrenica, Washington was skeptical. After
all, Srebrenica was a “safe area,” and even the Serbs would not so fla-
grantly violate international law.
Of course, having recently honed their mass-murder skills, the Serbs