The World’s Safest Food For a country like the United States, rich in technology and for-
titude, such imprecise estimates of illness, hospitalization, and death
are one indicator of the priority accorded food safety. Another is dis-
parate, century-old laws that still serve as the main tools of national
action. As the country’s population increased, the modern food sys-
tem went global. Food imports shot upward and widespread out-
breaks became common. Congress responded not by rethinking its
approach in light of underlying trends, but by tacking on ad hoc, make-
shift additional laws and calling for new regulations on top of what
already existed. What Congress has never done is set out to design a
food safety system that matches the complexity and scope of the glob-
ally expanding modern food system. Their approach has always been a
patchwork.
It’s no surprise that this mess of laws and rules is, as Marion Nestle
describes, “breathtaking in its irrationality.” Formally, it is cob-
bled together using twelve to fifteen different agencies, thirty to thirty-
five separate laws, and more than fifty interagency agreements. In-
formally, it requires extraordinary efforts of time, communication,
and coordination. Food safety in America is held together using the
policy equivalent of baling wire and duct tape.
The food-safety legal system’s inequities begin with its two main
agencies, FSIS and FDA. FSIS is responsible for 0 – 20 percent of the
food supply, but has traditionally received 0 percent of the two agencies’
combined food-safety budget. FDA is responsible for 80 – 90 percent of
the food supply, but has operated with one-third the staff.
Disparities are also found at the state level—often the front line in
responding to foodborne outbreaks. Over a ten-year period, Minnesota
investigated and resolved 2 separate state-level foodborne outbreaks.
During the same time frame, Texas, with five times the population, re-
solved eighteen cases.
Over the last three decades, demands on FDA have shot up, staff
levels have declined, and funding has remained erratic. In 200 , the
agency oversaw imports of fifteen million lines of products. A decade
later, the number had increased to forty million. In addition to a greater
number of outbreaks, the outbreaks were more widespread. Included in