112IRAN AND DUBAI LEAD THE WAYnormally debated in traditional family- tribal networks and then simply
launched: “Policy making isn’t very mature in the government. People
will just brainstorm around an idea, take it to the legal department, and
draft a law. From legal it goes to the diwan [ruler’s court] and then to
the sheikh. He will discuss whatever proposal they bring him. Most [pol-
icy makers] don’t see the value in consultation.”^48
But while avenues of citizen protest are not institutionalized in the
Gulf, they still exist, as we saw in Dubai. Complaints filter into the media
and social networks. Prominent citizens go directly to the ruler or his
agents. When the outcry is sharp enough, politics trumps economic
expediency, and the law is adjusted. As the same official stated: “We don’t
have a mechanism for public complaints. We hear about it through the
newspapers and our own social connections. We need channels of com-
munication.”^49
In addition to the “dictator’s dilemma” that makes it difficult to know
what subjects think, subsidies in autocratic settings have been described
as a “populist paradox.” Autocratic regimes do not face electoral pres-
sure that might lead them to manipulate energy prices for votes— but
they do fear instability. Generous subsidies reduce the risk of revolt
among a population that has few means for letting off steam and are a
“carrot” that regimes can use instead of the “stick” of violence to stay in
power.
Large resource endowments relative to the size of the population can
allow generous welfare spending and public salaries, which tend to ease
the use of repression.^50 (Table 7.1 shows how this has played out.) The
Arab Spring uprisings that ousted leaders in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya,
and Yemen demonstrate what can happen to autocrats who lose public
support— but few rich rentier autocracies found themselves combating
Arab Spring uprisings. There is a strong link between subsidies and
regime security, which provides yet another explanation for the dura-
bility of otherwise counterproductive energy policy.
With the dictator’s dilemma making it difficult to assess citizen atti-
tudes and the populist paradox exposing the attractiveness of subsidies
for stability’s sake, it’s no wonder these price supports have been so dura-
ble. Yet, with the regional economy on the line, the monarchies need to