46THE BIG PAYBACKsights were set not just on Israel but on the countries that were offering
support— most notably the United States, whose stubborn backing of
Israel’s occupations was the driving force for the embargo.
Pressure had been building for years. Diplomatic cables from the US
embassy in Jeddah and the US consulate in Dhahran chronicle the out-
rage in Saudi Arabia and across the Arab world at US arms sales to Israel
(which tilted the regional balance of power toward the Israelis) and the
seeming inability of Saudis and other Arabs to get their concerns taken
seriously in Washington. One diplomat described Saudi King Faisal as
“frustrated and bitter” over Washington’s “pro- Israel posture” in a 1972
telegram.^5
Aramco’s executives were particularly worried. In 1969, Aramco vice
president Frank Jungers told the US consul- general in Dhahran that
the Saudi oil minister had threatened to revoke Aramco’s concession
if the dispute continued.^6 The messages coming from the embassy con-
veyed the same concern. “We hope [the US government] will not agree
to sell additional arms to Israel. Damage to our interests in Arab world,
including S.A., could be irreparable,” a 1970 US embassy cable declared.
Threatened retaliation included breaks in diplomatic ties, boycotts of US
firms and goods, denial of US access to Arab bases and ports, and con-
version of dollar- based cash reserves to European currencies. More sup-
port for Israel, US diplomats in the Dhahran consulate wrote, “could
trigger a mass exodus of bulk of American community and could seri-
ously harm our interests.... We fully share ARAMCO’s concern re
possibility that additional arms sales to Israel could loosen spate of vio-
lence against Americans in S.A.”^7
Over the years, King Faisal sought to convince Washington to take a
“more balanced” approach. Following his father’s lead, Faisal asked a
succession of US presidents to acknowledge the Palestinian cause and
press Israel to return Arab lands. The king told President Richard Nixon
that the restoration of “old Jerusalem” to Arab control was his top pri-
ority. Faisal’s continued failure in these entreaties was a particular
frustration.^8
By August 1973, Faisal had seen enough. Washington would not
budge. The king assented to a private request by Egypt’s Anwar Sadat