202 Part 2: Strategic Actions: Strategy Formulation
$9.8 billion. Wall Street Journal, April 13, B3;
D. Cimilluca & J. Jargon, 2009, Corporate
news: Sara Lee weighs sale of European
business, Wall Street Journal, March 13, B3.- M. van Essen, J. Otten, & E. J. Carberry, 2015,
Assessing managerial power theory:
A meta-analytic approach to
understanding the determinants of CEO
compensation, Journal of Management,
41: 164–202; A. J. Nyberg, I. S. Fulmer, B.
Gerhart, & M. A. Carpenter, 2010, Agency
theory revisited: CEO return, and
shareholder interest alignment, Academy of
Management Journal, 53: 1029–1049. - X. Castañer & N. Kavadis, 2013, Does good
governance prevent bad strategy?
A study of corporate governance, financial
diversification, and value creation by
French corporations, 2000–2006, Strategic
Management Journal, 34: 863–876;
D. Souder, Z. Simsek, & S. G. Johnson, 2012,
The differing effects of agent and founder
CEOs on the firm’s market expansion,
Strategic Management Journal, 33: 23–41;
R. E. Hoskisson, M. W. Castleton, &
M. C. Withers, 2009, Complementarity in
monitoring and bonding: More intense
monitoring leads to higher executive
compensation, Academy of Management
Perspectives, 23: 57–74. - D. E. Black, S. S. Dikolli, & S. D. Dyreng, 2014,
CEO pay-for-complexity and the risk of
managerial diversion from multinational
diversification, Contemporary Accounting
Research, 31: 103–135; Pathak, Hoskisson, &
Johnson, 2014. - E. M. Fich, L. T. Starks, & A. S. Yore, 2014, CEO
deal-making activities and compensation,
Journal of Financial Economics, 114: 471–492;
M. van Essen, P. P. Heugens, J. Otto, &
J. van Oosterhout, 2012, An institution-
based view of executive compensation:
A multilevel meta-analytic test, Journal of
International Business Studies, 43: 396–423;
Y. Deutsch, T. Keil, & T. Laamanen, 2011,
A dual agency view of board
compensation: The joint effects of outside
director and CEO options on firm risk,
Strategic Management Journal, 32: 212–227. - R. Krause, K. A. Whitler, & M. Semadeni,
2014, Power to the principals! An
experimental look at shareholder say-
on-pay voting, Academy of Management
Journal, 57: 94–115.- Zhu & Chen, CEO narcissism and the
impact of prior board experience on
corporate strategy; A. J. Wowak &
D. C. Hambrick, 2010, A model of person-
pay interaction: How executives vary in their
responses to compensation arrangements,
Strategic Management Journal, 31:
803–821; J. Bogle, 2008, Reflections on CEO
compensation, Academy of Management
Perspectives, 22: 21–25. - E. Y. Rhee & P. C. Fiss, 2014, Framing
controversial actions: Regulatory focus,
source credibility, and stock market
reaction to poison pill adoption, Academy
of Management Journal, 57: 1734–1758; M.
Kahan & E. B. Rock, 2002, How I learned to
stop worrying and love the pill: Adaptive
responses to takeover law, University of
Chicago Law Review, 69: 871–915. - B. W. Benson, W. N. Davidson, T. R. Davidson, &
H. Wang, 2015, Do busy directors and CEOs
shirk their responsibilities? Evidence from
mergers and acquisitions, Quarterly Review
of Economics & Finance, 55: 1–19;
R. C. Anderson, T. W. Bates, J. M. Bizjak, &
M. L. Lemmon, 2000, Corporate
governance and firm diversification,
Financial Management, 29: 5–22;
J. D. Westphal, 1998, Board games: How
CEOs adapt to increases in structural
board independence from management,
Administrative Science Quarterly, 43: 511–537. - C. E. Devers, G. Mcnamara, J. Haleblian, &
M. E. Yoder, 2013, Do they walk the talk?
Gauging acquiring CEO and director
confidence in the value creation
potential of announced acquisitions,
Academy of Management Journal, 56:
1679–1702; S. M. Campbell, A. J. Ward,
J. A. Sonnenfeld, & B. R. Agle, 2008,
Relational ties that bind: Leader-follower
relationship dimensions and charismatic
attribution, Leadership Quarterly, 19:
556–568; M. Wiersema, 2002, Holes at the
top: Why CEO firings backfire, Harvard
Business Review, 80(12): 70–77. - R. E. Hoskisson, J. D. Arthurs, R. E. White, &
C. M. Wyatt, 2013. Multiple agency theory:
An emerging perspective on corporate
governance. In M. Wright, D. S. Siegel,
K. Keasey, & I. Filatotchev (eds.), The Oxford
Handbook of Corporate Governance, Oxford:
Oxford University Press; D. Allcock &
I. Filatotchev, 2010, Executive incentive
schemes in initial public offerings: The effects
of multiple-agency conflicts and corporate
governance, Journal of Management, 36:
663–686; N. Wasserman, 2006, Stewards,
agents, and the founder discount: Executive
compensation in new ventures, Academy of
Management Journal, 49: 960–976.- E. F. Fama, 1980, Agency problems and
the theory of the firm, Journal of Political
Economy, 88: 288–307. - H. Kim, R. E. Hoskisson, & S. Lee, 2015,
Why strategic factor markets matter:
‘New’ multinationals’ geographic
diversification and firm profitability,
Strategic Management Journal, 36:
518–536; M. Y. Brannen & M. F. Peterson,
2009, Merging without alienating:
Interventions promoting cross-cultural
organizational integration and their
limitations, Journal of International
Business Studies, 40: 468–489;
M. L. A. Hayward, 2002, When do firms
learn from their acquisition experience?
Evidence from 1990–1995, Strategic
Management Journal, 23: 21–39. - R. E. Hoskisson, R. A. Johnson, L. Tihanyi, &
R. E. White, 2005, Diversified business
groups and corporate refocusing
in emerging economies, Journal of
Management, 31: 941–965. - R. Chittoor, P. Kale, & P. Puranam, 2015.
Business groups in developing capital
markets: Towards a complementarity
perspective, Strategic Management
Journal, forthcoming; C. N. Chung &
X. Luo, 2008, Institutional logics or
agency costs: The influence of corporate
governance models on business group
restructuring in emerging economies,
Organization Science, 19: 766–784;
W. P. Wan & R. E. Hoskisson, 2003, Home
country environments, corporate
diversification strategies, and firm
performance, Academy of Management
Journal, 46: 27–45.