Michael_A._Hitt,_R._Duane_Ireland,_Robert_E._Hosk

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C-46 Part 4: Case Studies


The aim was to reduce the overall system costs and cycle
times and to ensure access...to crucial technology and
inputs.”^31 A useful example of this was the Deepstar alli-
ance led by Texaco, which involved over five dozen sup-
pliers, including other oil majors, in setting standards for
well, pipeline, and platform components in oil exploration
in waters as deep as 10,000 feet.^32
A final alliance type was called an OBO (operated by
others) relationship, a joint venture in which one partner
takes on the full responsibility of operating oil explora-
tions while the other solely invests capital.


Moving Forward


In the oil industry, the go-it-alone strategy was cost
prohibitive, and access by foreign firms to existing or
newly discovered oil sources was less likely without


a domestic partner. So managing partnerships was
critical, for BP or any other company. Most new oil
and gas discoveries would be made in remote areas
of the globe, with domestic and state-run oil compa-
nies heavily invested in exploration. Short of acquir-
ing these state-owned oil companies, BP would be the
minority shareholder in any new strategic partnership.
As the demand for these resources increased in large
and rapidly growing countries such as China and India,
and the value of oil and gas reserves continued to rise,
state-owned and domestic oil companies would pre-
fer to remain independent entities to maximize their
long-term revenues.
If its behavior in Russia was any indication, BP
appeared to lack certain skills necessary for being con-
sidered a good partner. What skills would be critical for
the company to develop moving forward?

NOTES



  1. On AAR see http://www.aar.ru/#. See also
    Sergey Ilyin, “The Interests of a Small Group
    are Much More Important Than Those
    of the State,” What the Papers Say Weekly
    Review, April 4, 2011.

  2. “BP and Russia in Arctic Oil Deal,” BBC News
    website, June 15, 2011, http://www.bbc.
    co.uk/news/business-12195576 (accessed
    September 9, 2011).

  3. T.K. Das and Bing-Sheng Teng, “The
    Dynamics of Alliance Conditions in the
    Alliance Development Process,” Journal of
    Management Studies 39, no. 5 (July 2002), 732.

  4. Andrew Neff, “Arbitration Tribunal Rules
    in Favor of AAR, Putting BP-Rosneft
    Exploration and Share-Swap Deal on Ice,”
    Global Insight, March 25, 2011.

  5. Petroleum Economist website, November 30,
    1999.

  6. Neela Banerjee, “BP Reported in Agreement
    to Regain Important Siberian Oil Field,”
    New York Times, December 22, 1999.

  7. Eduard Gismatullin, “TNK return
    Chernogorneft to Sidanko,” St. Petersburg
    Times, December 24, 1999.

  8. Banerjee.

  9. Anna Raff, “BP Buys Sidanko Stake for
    $375M,” Moscow Times, April 17, 2002.

  10. “BP Plunges Deep into Russia with New
    Tyumen Production Alliance,” Oil Daily,
    February 11, 2003.

  11. See Alla Startseva, “Onako Sale: Better
    Times Ahead for Investors?” St. Petersburg


Times, September 22, 2000. See also Yulia
Bushuyeva and Alexander Tutushkin, “TNK,
Sibneft Forge Partnership,” Moscow Times,
October 16, 2002.


  1. Catherine Belton and Isabel Gorst, “Police
    Raid BP’s Russian Venture,” Financial Times,
    March 19, 2003.

  2. The deal collapsed due to disagreements
    over the price of the sale. See Catherine
    Belton and Isabel Gorst, “Police Raid BP’s
    Russian Venture” and “BP in Russia:
    A Timeline,” Telegraph, May 17, 2011.

  3. Belton and Gorst, “BP in Russia: A Timeline.”

  4. Dudley was the chief executive of BP at the
    time of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. See
    Russel Hotten, “Russians Issue Legal Threat
    in BP Dispute,” Telegraph, July 24, 2008, and
    Neff.

  5. Rowena Mason, “Mikhail Fridman to
    Step Down as TNK-BP Boss,” Telegraph,
    November 11, 2009.

  6. Anna Ruff, “Rosneft, TNK Eye Sakhalin,”
    Moscow Times, July 25, 2002. It should
    be noted that TNK also made an effort
    to enter into the Sakhalin oil exploration
    market with Rosneft as a partner but was
    rebuffed.

  7. Rachel Graham, “Rosneft, BP sign Sakhalin
    Operating Accords: Agreements over
    License Blocks at Sakhalin 4 and 5,” Platts
    Oilgram News, November 24, 2006.

  8. “BP, Rosneft give up on East Schmidt
    Sakhalin-5,” New Europe, February 21, 2010.
    20. Neff.
    21. “BP Faces Court Challenge to Rosneft Pact,”
    International Oil Daily, January 28, 2011.
    22. Gordon Wilcox, “TNK-BP Makes $8.1B Bid
    for BP Stake,” Benzinga, March 1, 2011.
    23. “FP Deal Flow: TNK-BP’s US $8.16B Stake
    Offer; Buffett Betrayed,” Financial Post,
    March 2, 2011.
    24. “Russia’s Rosneft Vows to Complete BP
    Tie-up,” Agence France-Presse (English),
    March 11, 2011.
    25. Neff, “BP Rejects TNK-BP’s Proposal to Join
    Rosneft Exploration Alliance,” Global Insight
    website, March 14, 2011.
    26. Neff, “Arbitration Tribunal Rules in Favor
    of AAR.”
    27. David Ernst and Andrew M.J. Steinhubl,
    “Alliances in Upstream Oil and Gas,”
    McKinsey Quarterly no. 2 (1997), 149.
    28. Ernst and Steinhubl, “Petroleum: After the
    Megamergers,” McKinsey Quarterly no. 2
    (1999), 48–57.
    29. Ernst and Steinhubl, “Alliances in Upstream
    Oil and Gas,” 152.
    30. Ernst and Steinhubl.
    31. Ernst and Steinhubl, 153.
    32. Paul R. Hays and G. Ray Seid “DeepStar
    Enters Fifth Phase of Deepwater Mission,”
    WorldOil Online, May 2000, http://www.
    worldoil.com/May-2000-DeepStar-enters-
    fifth-phase-of-deepwater-mission.html
    (accessed June 20, 2011). See also Ernst and
    Steinhubl.

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