202 ChaPter^4
She, like FDR, was a “patrician” reformer, one with a sense of obligation
[noblesse oblige] because she or he came from a higher class to help those lower
on the social ladder. They did not necessarily see labor relations as negotia-
tions between equal partners, but as a form of charity work. Their first
approach was similar to Wilson’s policy during the Great War, namely to put
the economy on a crisis [or “wartime”] footing and make significant efforts
to fix the crisis. Similar to Hoover in 1929, FDR wanted industry, agriculture,
finance, and labor to make adjustments—reduce production, cut back on
hours of labor, guarantee collective bargaining, stabilize prices, in short, to
engage in national economic planning. But FDR became president 4 years
after the depression hit and worsened, and went back-and-forth on his policies
more than his predecessor, at times being a conservative reformer and occa-
sionally posing as an activist or even “radical” advocate of labor.
For Roosevelt, again like Hoover, the key point was that he and his New
Deal firmly supported Capitalism, with its private ownership of the means of
production, free from state control. So FDR would reform, smooth out, and
tweak the system, but state control or even coercive central government
involvement, let alone anything like workers control or redistribution of
wealth, or of course Socialism, were never even considered. FDR’s priorities
were to fix industry and agriculture rather than make labor his principal area
of concern. In the NIRA, he did affirm minimum wage laws, forbade child
labor, and support unions and collective bargaining in section 7a, but employ-
ers were always hostile to it and Roosevelt vacillated between supporting
Capital and labor at different points. He did, however, assure industrialists
that 7a was “not a law to foment discord and it will not be executed as such.
This is a time for mutual confidence and help.” Hoover could have uttered
those very same words.
For labor, the effect of 7a varied. With the UMW, it helped increase mem-
bership significantly as John L. Lewis told the miners that the president [he
did not specify whether he meant FDR or himself] expected them to join the
union, and mine operators were confused too so the workers’ union took
advantage of the situation. Lewis assumed that since the UMW was support-
ing the New Deal that FDR would defend their interests—unions, bargaining,
and strikes—but the president, once more like Hoover, wanted to avoid con-
flicts in the coal industry. The steel industry was more difficult. Steel com-
panies opposed unions and came up with schemes to create company unions—