242 ChaPter^5
Ishii Agreement, and other events all pointed to the importance of Asian
markets for trade, materials and investment in order to create a world of free
trade. Standing in the way, as U.S. leaders saw it, were two forces—European
imperialism, and Japan. Various countries of Europe had established colonies
throughout Asia, and the U.S. would spend a good part of the 20th Century
trying to change those conditions. Within Asia, Japan was the greatest inter-
est, because it was the most “modern,” or industrialized nation in the region
and thus on roughly equal terms with western nations. In the 1895 Sino-
Japanese War and the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War, the government and
military in Tokyo proved they could compete as a world power. Shortly after,
Japan began a policy of conquest, invading and occupying Korea in 1910 and
ruling it ruthlessly, sending Korean men to Japan to work in factories as vir-
tual slaves and making Korean women travel with their army as “comfort
women.” For the U.S., Japan’s rise was troubling. Americans were already
investing in Asia and it was critical to their economic interests. Asia furnished
51 percent of the prewar raw and crude materials imported into the U.S.
British Malay and the Dutch East Indies [now Malaysia and Indonesia] sup-
plied 86 percent of the crude rubber and 87 percent of tin used in the U.S.
Overall, Asian countries produced 85 percent of the tungsten, one-third of the
mica [a mineral essential insulation and electrical equipment], 99 percent of
the jute [a fiber used for sacking and cordage], and 98 percent of the shellac
[varnishes and sealants] brought into America.
Given the economic importance of Asia, Japan’s claim to supremacy there,
based on cultural and geographic similarities, could threaten the American
economy if commercial relations turned bad. Thus the U.S. had to recognize
Japan’s role in Asia and its military power. In 1921-22 the Americans, British,
and Japanese reached agreements on the size of naval forces allowed and
sought to cut the number of ships each country had, while conceding Japan’s
upper hand but trying to maintain the Open Door. Japan, however, had no
interest in sharing the resources or markets of Asia and aimed to create a
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, a complex sounding term for a rela-
tively basic concept. The “sphere” was an imperial project, a policy in which
the Japanese would dominate East Asia and keep it safe from western impe-
rialists, meanwhile asserting control over the resources and markets of the
region. Like the Germans in Europe, the Japanese were trying to close the
door to “free trade.” Taking Korea was but a first step in a much larger pro-