World War and the Growth of Global Power 283to anti-union firms, he, with Hillman in agreement, said the war against the
Axis was more important than domestic issues [a situation similar to that with
A. Philip Randolph and the FEPC]. In January 1941, Roosevelt established the
Office of Production Management [OPM] with William Knudsen and Hillman
as co-directors. Labor, it seemed, had gained an equal share in defense plan-
ning but even Hillman’s presence did not change things, as the labor commit-
tees were deemed, again, “advisory,” and the OPM was in reality run by the
representatives of industry.
Pearl Harbor shook things up a bit. In December, just after the U.S. entry
into the war, FDR met with corporate and labor representatives on how best
to work together to maximize wartime production. Bot sides condemned
lockouts and strikes but corporations expected no change in its control over
workers and wanted the open shop, with workers free to not join the unions
if they wished. But both sides made concessions. With government contracts
on a “costs-plus” basis pouring into industries, they needed workers and could
afford to offer higher wages and put their opposition to unions on hold for
the duration in order to maintain industrial harmony, and growing profits. But
the “no strikes” pledge by labor was even more important. With the need for
wartime production high, workers gave up virtually the only power they had,
the ability to stop work in the factory by going on strike. The AFL said that
“to cease production is to strike at the very heart of the nation.” The CIO,
accused by corporations so often of being too radical or even Communist,
announced it would “redouble its energies to promote and plan for ever-
increasing production.” Even Business Week acknowledged labor’s cooperation,
which included unions that actually did have Communists in them—once the
U.S. and Russia became allies, American radicals fell in line with the war
effort almost totally. As the magazine noted, “in general, employers with
whom they deal now have the most peaceful labor relations in industry.
Complaints to the union’s national officers usually will bring all the organiza-
tion’s disciplinary apparatus to focus on the heads of the unruly local leaders.”
By early 1942, labor relations were as calm and peaceful as they had been
in decades. For 5 months after Pearl Harbor, there had not been any autho-
rized strikes and union officials ended “wildcat strikes,” spontaneous stop-
pages in the factories, as soon as they broke out. But that harmony was not
easy to attain. In 1941, before the war, labor had conducted a series of strikes
from January to December, 70 percent of which were CIO-led and mostly in