World War and the Growth of Global Power 285anything about it. In order to keep labor from breaking the no-strike pledge,
the WLB and union bosses came up with the concept of “maintenance-of-
membership” clauses in their contracts, which meant that once a company and
union agreed on a contract, union members could not withdraw from it dur-
ing the duration of the contract. New members had to join the union and
old members could not leave it. The CIO was happy, for the maintenance
clause guaranteed it would get more men and women joining the union, and
thus paying dues. Many workers, however, were not as happy as labor leaders
about the state of affairs, and in 1943 began a series of wildcat strikes in vari-
ous industries. They were not voted on or organized, and occurred without
notice as workers simply shut down production, despite the existence of the
no-strike deals that the union itself enforced. FDR, still attacked by many
conservatives as pro-labor, became more angry with the wildcatters, who
slowed down production in war materials: “I shall use all the power vested in
me as president and Commander-in-Chief... to protect the national interest
and to prevent further interference with the successful prosecution of the
war.” In late 1943, miners went on strike and Roosevelt took drastic action.
He “seized” the mines and put them under control of the Commerce Secretary
Harold Ickes, and ordered him to negotiate with the union. Twice, Ickes and
John L. Lewis reached deals, but the WLB and FDR rejected them. Even
though Roosevelt had consistently stood in the way of the UMW’s and
Lewis’s plans, conservatives still believed that the union president had too
much influence over FDR and were angry, and a little alarmed, at his role in
calling the strikes and upsetting production.
In the end, the UMW got a good increase in wages, including time spent
going to-and-from the mines, not just digging for coal. The strike ended due
to government coercion, FDR’s seizure and forcing Ickes to work out a deal
with Lewis, not because of political moves or negotiations with the WLB. By
this time, public opinion was heavily anti-labor. Still, the wildcat actions con-
tinued. In 1944, 6500 miners in Pennsylvania left their jobs; 10,000 workers
at Briggs Manufacturing in Detroit left work for one day to protest changes
in their work schedules; 10,000 more struck at a roller bearing mill in Canton,
Ohio twice in 1944 while 20,000 left work at Ford’s Willow Run bomber
plant to protest changes in work rules and schedules. Even with the no-strike
pledge, labor was able to make gains by walking out on the job and forcing
the bosses, who were making such huge profits from their war contracts, to