The Growth of American Power Through Cold and Hot Wars 293The main point of these atomic critics, the best known of whom was Gar
Alperovitz, the author of a controversial book titled Atomic Diplomacy, was that
the atomic bomb was not necessary from a military point-of- view because
the Japanese were in such dire shape that the war was essentially over by mid-
- Alperovitz and others base their criticism of the use of the bomb on
much of the following evidence:
- In February, 1945, President Roosevelt, Soviet Union leader Stalin, and
British Prime Minister Churchill met and agreed that the Russians would
enter the war against Japan precisely three months after the European
phase of the war was over. More recently, Japanese historians have discov-
ered that this was Japan’s greatest fear–that the Soviet Union would enter
Japanese territory, and conquer and occupy it.
- At the same time, American military officials were busy preparing for a
military invasion of Japan, and they had two important assumptions in
their planning. First, they believed that Japan was already devastated from
the grind of war and devastating air attacks–especially the incendiary, or
fire, bombing–from the U.S. Air Force. Second, they believed, as noted,
that Japan deeply feared a Russian declaration of war and that concern,
by itself–prior to an attack –would almost surely force the leaders in
Tokyo to surrender.
- In the Spring of 1945, American officials had intercepted Japanese mes-
sages and learned that leaders in Tokyo were trying to work with the
Russians on a settlement/surrender plan with one major condition–that
they would retain their leader, Emperor Hirohito. The Americans had
already announced a policy of “unconditional surrender” and wanted to
be sure that Japan would not be a threat to the Open Door after the war,
so ignored the Japanese evidence of desperation. In the U.S., however,
there was a strong media push to end the war quickly, even if this meant
keeping the emperor in place.
- On May 8th, the war in Europe ended, meaning that the Soviet pledge
to attack Japan would be effective at the beginning of August, 1945.
- In the first half of 1945, U.S. military planners, unquestionably aware of
Tokyo’s desperation, began planning for an invasion of Japan. They
assumed that the earliest date for a limited invasion, of the Ryuku
Islands, was November 1st, 1945, while the earliest date for an invasion