294 ChaPter^6
of the Japanese mainland was January 1st, 1946–both dates are signifi-
cantly later than the early August Soviet promise of intervention, which,
as noted, planners assumed would force a Japanese surrender by itself.
U.S. military officials, led by General George Marshall, also assumed that
the U.S. could expect about 25,000-50,000 casualties as the result of a
land invasion.- On July 17th, 1945 President Truman met with new British Prime
Minister Clement Attlee and Stalin at Potsdam, Germany. The U.S. had
delayed the meeting for a couple weeks, claiming pressing budget mat-
ters. In reality, Truman was buying time to allow for a test of the atomic
bomb scheduled for Almogordo, New Mexico. At Potsdam, Stalin reaf-
firmed Russian plans to enter the war, but the U.S. was now not eager
for Stalin’s help. Truman had received word that the A- Bomb test had
been a success and he then began, as his aide James Byrnes described it,
to “carry the bomb around on his hip.” His previously diplomatic tone
gave way to a much more aggressive attitude and he began to issue
orders to Soviet officials. - On August 6th, just days before the Soviet Union was to enter the war
[which Japan feared above all else], and months before any U.S. invasion,
limited or full, was possible, and aware that Japan was badly destroyed
and desperate, Truman ordered the bombing of Hiroshima and then
Nagasaki. Japan surrendered within the week. Hirohito was retained as
emperor.
The initial public reaction to the use of the bomb was not as overwhelm-
ingly positive as one might think. The country was split about evenly on its
use. Many Americans, including the National Council of Bishops and conser-
vatives like William Buckley Sr., criticized Truman’s decision on moral and
practical grounds. Many if not most of the president’s military advisors, includ-
ing Generals Dwight Eisehnower, Douglas MacArthur and Curtis LeMay, had
advised against using the A-Bomb, finding it unnecessary and provocative. In
fact, Eisenhower, the commander of the European Theater of Operations and
future president, recalled a meeting with the secretary of war:During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling
of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis