310 ChaPter^6
U.S. response was a dedicated and noble effort to preserve freedom in Europe
and stand up to a zealous Communist aggressor, economic conditions in the
United States were also motivating American policies with regard to European
affairs in 1948-49. As the historian Frank Kofsky has argued, the crisis was
invented. American officials exaggerated Communist actions to pressure
Congress and the public to accept a major military buildup. In particular, the
aircraft industry, which had suffered from a deep economic slump in peace-
time, and the Air Force, a recently-created service looking to expand its mis-
sion and influence, essentially created drama to pressure political leaders and
the media, and thus the public, to support vastly expanded military spending,
and to convince Europeans of the need for an American-led military alliance.
Aircraft officials and their political supporters pushed for the government to
supply more planes to the Air Force due to the “threat” of the Soviet Union.
The fear tactics apparently worked. As the pentagon observed, “At the end of
1948, the aircraft industry was in its best financial condition since the end of
the war. Sales of the sixteen major airframe manufacturers reached a postwar
high in 1948 of $1,188 million compared with $856 million in 1947 and $730
million in 1946. Only three manufacturers...lost money during 1948, while
eleven of the sixteen manufacturers operated at a loss during 1947.”
Building on the Berlin Crisis and the “war scare,” American leaders orga-
nized a western military alliance for the cold war, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, or NATO, in 1949. A year earlier, the British, French and small-
er European nations had signed a treaty promising to aid each other in the
event of attack. NATO expanded that mission to twelve countries, each
pledging to support the others in the event of attack, and committed to
develop “free institutions” via economic collaboration. In fact, on the same
day that NATO was approved in congress, Truman also proposed a $1 billion
European military aid program. So, one important purpose of such military
alliances, as one official pointed out, was “to build up our own military indus-
try” as well as to hold down “nationalistic tendencies” in Europe. But the
overriding goal may have been to extend America’s political influence, or
control, over Europe through a military alliance. As one senator put it, “the
Atlantic Pact is but the logical extension of the principle of the Monroe
Doctrine.” In this case, however, the United States would hold sway over the
industrialized and developed continent of Europe rather than just the Third
World backyard of Latin America.