448 ChaPter^9
official that “you would kill ten of my men for every one I killed of yours.
But even at that rate you would be unable to hold out, and victory would go
to me.” Ho and the Viet Minh would fight a guerrilla war–a conflict unlike
the big battles that had characterized World War II with tanks, armor and
huge divisions–waged with small units, hit-and-run tactics, sabotage, political
assassinations, destruction of communications or infrastructure networks, and
the like—a “little war” rather than a conventional big war. As one Vietnamese
leader, Truong Chinh, explained, “if the enemy attacks us from above, we will
attack him from below. If he attacks us in the North, we will respond in
Central or South Vietnam, or in Cambodia and Laos. If the enemy penetrates
one of our territorial bases, we will immediately strike hard at his belly and
back... cut off his legs, destroy his roads.” Such tactics would anger and
frustrate the French, with one of their officers complaining “if only the
Vietnamese would face us in a set battle, how we would crush them!” Ho and
Giap realized that too, and would spend the next generation hiding and escap-
ing from and eluding French, and American, forces.
While the Viet Minh conducted mostly guerrilla operations, the French
offered a fierce technological response. When, in 1950-51, Giap began attacks
against the French along the Chinese border with great success [France lost
about 6000 troops and a large amount of material] the French dropped
American-made bombs of napalm, like those used against Germany and Japan
in World War II, which were described by one Vietnamese soldier like this:
“Another plane approaches and spews more fire. The bomb falls behind us and
I feel its fiery breath which passes over my entire body. Men flee, and I can no
longer restrain them. There is no way to live under that torrent of fire which
runs and burns all in its route.” In that assault alone, the French killed over
6000 Viet Minh. Because of such losses, Giap decided to avoid such large
groups of French forces and French weapons, and committed the Viet Minh
almost exclusively to a strategy of protracted war, meaning they were willing to
wage a long-term, very long-term if needed, struggle using guerrilla tactics to
defeat the enemy. No “quick victory,” like using airpower and atomic bombs
the way the U.S. did to end World War II, was possible, so the Vietnamese had
to be prepared to fight for as long as they had to in order to force France out
of their country, using whatever tactics, mostly small engagements, that worked.
By 1953, French prospects were fading. Their new commander, General
Henri Navarre, proposed a major expansion of the French efforts and the U.S.