454 ChaPter^9
immolation as a “Buddhist barbecue” and offered to supply fuel for the next
one. Diem continued to strike at the Buddhists, but after nearly a decade of
supporting the RVN, it was finally clear that he was beyond rehabilitation. The
U.S., which had followed a policy of “sink or swim with Ngo Dinh Diem,”
finally helped engineer his overthrow on 1 November 1963 in a coup led by
ARVN officers in which Diem and Nhu were both killed.
There was, however, a private yet probably more important reason behind
the U.S. abandonment of Diem. His brother Nhu, aware that the regime’s days
were numbered, began to talk to the NLF about a negotiated settlement and
the establishment of a coalition, neutral government in the South, with Diem’s
family and the NLF both included. Eventually, everyone understood, the
Communists would emerge with control of the government as the Ngos were
more likely to head to Paris with their riches. For the Americans, killing
Buddhists may have created awfully bad press, but going behind U.S. backs
to discuss an end to the civil war was unforgivable. Afraid that peace might
break out short of victory, Kennedy reiterated the American commitment to
Vietnam in late 1963. In interviews he insisted that Vietnam was “a very
important struggle” and that withdrawal “only makes it easy for the
Communists. I think we should stay.” Despite recognizing the laundry list of
military and political shortcomings and barriers to success in the RVN, and
sending 16,000 advisors and billions of dollars to that point with little notice-
able improvement, JFK was not retreating from his commitment in Vietnam.The Chaos Continues and America Escalates
Lyndon Johnson of Texas became president upon John Kennedy’s assassination
on November 22nd, 1963, and was dedicated to “seeing things through in
Vietnam.” At his first meeting with advisors he told them to “tell those gener-
als in Saigon that Lyndon Johnson intends to stand by our word.” That would
be difficult, however, because politics in the RVN continued to be chaotic.
Diem’s replacement, Duong Van “Big” Minh, lost U.S. support when he, like
Diem and Nhu, considered a negotiated, neutralist settlement with the NLF.
The South had no real sovereignty as its leaders could not even talk to north-
ern leaders without serious repercussions from the U.S. Then, in another
coup, directed by American officials, General Nguyen Khanh came to power
in January 1964. Minh, however, remained in country and he and Khanh con-