458 ChaPter^9
ings did not affect the DRVN’s ability to support the insurgency or its resolve
to liberate Vietnam on both sides of the 17th parallel. The Army’s Chief of
Staff, General Harold K. Johnson, later observed that “if anything came out of
Vietnam, it was that airpower couldn’t do the job.”
It was thus clear in early 1965 that NLF victory was imminent short of a
dramatic American response. So, on March 8th, American Marines landed at
Da Nang, the first U.S. troops to enter Vietnam with a stated purpose to fight
the VC. By April, the U.S. had 33,000 troops in the RVN, with another 20,000
on the way, and they were engaging in offensive operations against the VC.
Just months later, with conditions no better, the U.S. commander, General
William Westmoreland, asked for an additional 44 battalions [125,000 troops] and
authority to conduct operations in the RVN with even fewer restrictions.
After debating the issue, Johnson, on July 28th, approved the deployment of
50,000 troops to Vietnam, increased monthly draft calls to 35,000, and prom-
ised more soldiers to Westmoreland “as requested.” That decision essentially
Americanized the war in Vietnam as Johnson had signaled that the U.S. was
ready to take over the responsibility of fighting the VC instead of having the
southern Vietnamese do it. Shortly after the July decisions, LBJ received a
telegram from the Hell’s Angels Motorcycle Gang offering to go to Vietnam
to kill Communists. At least someone wanted to.Beyond Vietnam: Brazil, the DR, and Indonesia, 1964-66
Lyndon Johnson was obviously preoccupied with Vietnam, but that did not
stop him form becoming involved in other major actions at the same time. In
Brazil, the Dominican Republic [DR] and Indonesia, the president and others
claimed that “Communists” were threatening U.S. interests and intervened to
eliminate the left and put pro-American politicians, who violated human
rights but were friendly to American corporate and political interests, in
power. In Brazil in 1964, the U.S. feared the government of João Goulart, who,
once again, was considered a Communist without much evidence for the
accusation. Goulart’s threat was not really “Communism” but trying to fix
inequality in Brazil, where 20 percent of the elite owned almost everything
and 70 percent had menial jobs or were homeless [conditions similar to those
which provoked protest during the 2014 World Cup soccer tourney]. There
were probably about 80,000 Communists in Brazil out of a total population