Vietnam, Protest, and Counterculture 465voke the Americans into a battle in order to learn how to fight them— “We
wanted to lure the tiger out of the mountain,” one commander explained.
Moreover, the PAVN retreat was not a concession but rather part of the plan:
“We did not have any plans to liberate the land,” a northern general related,
“only to destroy troops.” General Giap had learned valuable lessons from Ia
Drang as well, and thereafter avoided such big-unit engagements unless on
terms preferable to the PAVN.
Westmoreland saw things otherwise, however, and continued his war of
attrition. Thus, in battles similar to Ia Drang, American units caused serious
losses to the enemy in operations in 1966 and early 1967, but without long-
term impact. In Operation Cedar Falls, for instance, American infantry,
armored, and airborne units wanted to clear the “Iron Triangle” outside of
Saigon of VC using a “hammer and anvil” tactic in which American units at
one end of the war zone would drive the enemy into other units deployed on
the other edge of the battlefield. The VC lost about 750 soldiers and had a
huge complex of tunnels destroyed during the operation, but the victory was
temporary at best. Before the operation, U.S. forces had to clear civilians out
of the Iron Triangle so that they could establish a free fire zone in which all
Vietnamese were considered VC and potential targets of American firepower.
By displacing and attacking the villagers in the area, the Americans alienated
the very people they were there to help. Then, just 6 months after Cedar Falls,
the VC returned in full strength, with even more support from the local
population than before. The VC “just backed off and waited,” one U.S. gen-
eral said. “They were more elusive. They controlled the battle better. They
were the ones who decided whether there should be a fight.”
The enemy was remaining strong and held the military initiative in 1966
and 1967. Despite massive air strikes on the Ho Chi Minh Trail—a supply route
running from the DRVN, through Laos and Cambodia, and into the South—
the enemy was still infiltrating nearly 10,000 men below the 17th parallel per
month, while recruiting another 3000 in the RVN, so the enemy could infil-
trate more than 150,000 troops into the RVN. Such VC strength, on top of
continued ARVN inactivity [southern Vietnamese units only made contact
with the enemy in 40 percent of engagements] led Westmoreland time and
again to ask for more troops. The commander needed additional men merely
to keep up with the enemy, but he would not reconsider his strategy.Lyndon
Johnson wanted progress in Vietnam so that the war would not wreck his