468 ChaPter^9
Since 1968, the Tet Offensive has become a myth with scholars and politi-
cians claiming—as Westmoreland and Johnson publicly said at the time–that
it was a great U.S. military victory, but political and psychological defeat. In
their minds, the U.S. military wiped out the enemy during Tet, but the U.S.
media and public were so shocked by the scope of the offensive that they
incorrectly saw it as a defeat.Such observations, however, neglect the military’s
own outlook on the war in February and March 1968. Just days after the
attacks began, Westmoreland reported to Wheeler that, “from a realistic point
of view, we must accept the fact that the enemy has dealt [South Vietnam] a
severe blow,” bringing the war to the people, inflicting heavy casualties and
damage, and disrupting the economy. The commander also recognized that the
enemy’s objectives “were primarily psychological and political.” A week later
Westmoreland would candidly explain, “we are now in a new Ball game
where we face a determined, highly disciplined enemy, fully mobilized to
achieve a quick victory.” Such reports would continue throughout February
1968, leading an obviously-alarmed Lyndon Johnson to send the Chairman ofFIGuRE 9-10 President Johnson visits injured servicemen returned from
Vietnam