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the U.S. had done from the Cold War forward, the government would use
military spending to help the economy, use public money to keep spending,
and thus economic activity, going. If not military spending, then the govern-
ment might have to fund social programs such as health care, education, or
jobs, and that, conservatives screamed, would be “Socialism.” Reagan of
course was no Socialist, but when it came to the state giving money to the
pentagon, he was as big an advocate of government intervention in the econ-
omy as anyone. Indeed, Reagan had the support of influential industry and
political leaders in his quest to raise defense spending.
A group called the Committee on the Present Danger [CPD] was spreading
alarm that the U.S. had fallen badly behind the Soviet Union and had to pro-
duce significantly more weapons, and of course spend more money, to keep
America safe. The group even had inside government support. In the mid-
1970s, the CIA had done an extensive study of the Soviet Union that con-
cluded that Russia was in deep trouble. Its economy was failing and, though
it had a huge arsenal of weapons, its military capabilities were not impressive.
Surely, this was good news–America’s main rival was in deteriorating shape!
But without a strong enemy, it would be harder to justify more military spend-
ing at home. So the head of the CIA in 1975- 76, George Bush, Sr., killed
that report and commissioned another group, dubbed Team B, to also study
Russia’s strengths and capabilities. This time, Team B concluded, opposite the
first group of experts, that the Soviet Union was strong, getting stronger, and
remained a grave threat to American interests. Only a huge increase in mili-
tary spending could stop that menace. So, once in office, working off the ideas
of the CPD, Reagan increased defense budgets by nearly 40 percent in his
terms as president, from around $300 billion annually, to over $425 billion
when he left office in 1989, the largest sustained military spending escalation
in peacetime in American history.
As a share of the Gross National Product, military spending increased from
5.2 to 6.6 percent, and its share of the entire federal budget went from 23 up
to 27 percent. These increases were mostly due to spending on more, and
newer, weapons rather than personnel. “Investment” like research and devel-
opment or military construction went up by 95 percent while increases for
personnel [such as pay for the troops] rose by just 13 percent. The spending
increase for strategic nuclear weapons was well over 300 percent [from $9.4
to $35.3 billion] and conventional and tactical nuclear weapons costs went up