92 CHAPTER THREE ■ InternatIonal relatIons theorIes
Fi nally, virtually all radical theorists, regardless of their specific emphases, are nor-
mative in their orientation. They evaluate the hierarchical cap i tal ist structure as “bad”
and its methods as invariably exploitative. They have clear normative and activist posi-
tions about what should be done to ameliorate inequalities among both individuals
and states— ranging from forming radical organ izations Leninists support, to making
more incremental changes de pen dency theorists might suggest.
In some quarters, radicalism has been discredited as an international relations the-
ory. Radicalism cannot explain why cooperation began to emerge between cap i tal ist
and socialist states even before the end of the Cold War. And it cannot explain obvious
divisiveness among noncapitalist states. For example, in 1948, communist Yugo slavia
and the USSR dramatically split over the former’s refusal to submit impor tant domes-
tic and foreign policy decisions for Stalin’s approval. Radicalism also can’t explain why
and how some developing countries such as India have successfully adopted a cap i tal ist
approach and escaped from economic and po liti cal de pen dency. Radicalism could not
have predicted such developments. And radicalism, just like liberalism and realism,
did not foresee or predict the demise of the Soviet Union, arguably one of the most
significant changes in the twentieth century. Each theory, despite claims of compre-
hensiveness, has significant shortcomings.
In other circles, radicalism has survived as a theory of economic determinism and
as a force advocating major change in the international system’s structure. Its critique
of market capitalism’s tendency to cause income in equality is as vibrant as ever. Radi-
calism helps us understand the role of economic forces, both within and between states,
and to explain the dynamics of late- twentieth- century economic globalization and the
2008 economic crisis, as Chapter 9 discusses.
social constructivism
A late- twentieth- century addition to international relations, constructivism, has
returned international relations scholars to foundational questions, including the nature
of the state and the concepts of sovereignty, identity, and citizenship. In addition, con-
structivism has opened new substantive areas to inquiry, such as the roles of gender
and ethnicity, which have been largely absent from other international relations theo-
ries. Yet like liberalism, realism, and radicalism, constructivism is not a uniform the-
ory. Indeed, some scholars question whether it is a substantive theory at all. That said,
most constructivists do share a number of core ideas.
Constructivism’s major theoretical proposition is that neither objects nor con-
cepts have any necessary, fixed, or objective meaning; rather, their meanings are con-
structed through social interaction. In other words, we bring meaning to objects, not