Foreign Policy Elites: Individuals Who Matter 189Individual Decision Making
Decisions that individual decision makers take may reflect the fact that they are
confronted with the task of putting divergent information into an or ga nized form.
The rational model of decision making that we discussed in Chapter 5 suggests that
the individual possesses all the relevant information, stipulates a goal, examines the
relevant choices, and makes a decision that best achieves that goal. In actuality, how-
ever, individuals are not always rational decision makers. Confronted by information
that is neither perfect nor complete, and often overwhelmed by a plethora of informa-
tion and conditioned by personal experience, the decision maker selects, organizes,
and evaluates incoming information about the surrounding world.
Individuals use a variety of psychological techniques to pro cess and evaluate
information. In perceiving and interpreting new and often contradictory informa-
tion, individuals rely on existing perceptions, usually based on prior experiences.
Such perceptions are the “screens” that enable individuals to pro cess information
selectively; these perceptions have an integrating function, permitting the individual
to synthesize and interpret the information. Perceptions also serve an orienting function,
providing guidance about future expectations and expediting planning for future con-
tingencies. If those perceptions form a relatively integrated set of images, then they are
called a belief system.
International relations scholars have devised methods to test the existence of
elite perceptions, although research has not been conducted on many individuals
because sufficient data are usually unavailable. Ole Holsti systematically analyzed
434 of the publicly available statements of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles con-
cerning the Soviet Union during the years 1953–54. His research showed convinc-
ingly that Dulles held an unwavering image of the Soviet Union, focusing on atheism,
totalitarianism, and communism. To Dulles, the Soviet people were good, but their
leaders were bad; the state was good, the Communist party bad. This image was
unvarying; the character of the Soviet Union did not change. Whether this percep-
tion, gleaned from Dulles’s statements, affected U.S. decisions during the period
cannot be stated with certainty. He was, after all, only one among a group of top
leaders. Yet a plethora of decisions made during that time is consistent with his per-
ception.^9
The po liti cal scientists Harvey Starr and Stephen Walker both completed similar
empirical research on Henry Kissinger.^10 Elucidating Kissinger’s operational code (the
rules he operated by) from his scholarly writings, Walker found that the conduct of
the Vietnam War, orchestrated in large part by Kissinger between 1969 and 1973, was
congruent with the premises of his operational code and his conception of mutually
acceptable outcomes. He wanted to negotiate a mutual withdrawal of external forces