of a group of herders who share a common grazing area. Each herder finds it eco nom
ically rational to increase the size of his own herd, allowing him to sell more in the
market. Yet if all herders follow what is individually rational be hav ior, then the group
loses: too many animals graze the land and the quality of the pasture deteriorates,
leading to decreased output for all. As each person rationally attempts to maximize his
own gain, the collectivity suffers, and, eventually, all individuals suffer.^3
What Hardin describes— the common grazing area—is a collective good. The
grazing area is available to all group members, regardless of individual contribution.
The use of collective goods involves interdependent activities and choices. Decisions
by one state have effects for other states— that is, states can suffer unanticipated nega
tive consequences because of the actions of others. For example, the decision by wealthy
countries to continue the production and sale of chlorofluorocarbons affects all coun
tries through long term depletion of the ozone layer. With collective goods, market
mechanisms break down. Alternative forms of management are needed.
Hardin proposed several pos si ble solutions to the tragedy of the commons. First,
use coercion. Force nations or peoples to control the collective goods. States, for
example, could force people to limit the number of children they have to prevent a
population explosion that would harm the environment. Second, restructure the pref
erences of states through rewards and punishments. Offer positive incentives for states
to refrain from engaging in the destruction of the commons; tax, or threaten to tax,
those who fail to cooperate. Third, alter the size of the group. Smaller groups can more
effectively exert pressure on their members because violations of the commons will be
more easily noticed. China’s long time population policy of one child per couple was
administered locally. Close monitoring, coupled with strong social pressure, is more
likely to lead to compliance. These alternatives can also be achieved through interna
tional organ izations. For many, they are the preferred way to address prob lems of the
commons— the sea, space, the environment.
ColleCtive Goods■ Collective goods are available to all
members of a group, regardless of
individual contributions.
■ Some activities of states involve the
provision of collective goods.
■ Groups need to devise strategies to
overcome prob lems of collectivegoods caused by the negative
consequences of the actions of
others— the “tragedy of the
commons.”
■ Strategies include coercion, altering
preferences by offering incentives,
and altering the size of the group.i n FoCus
212 CHAPTER SEvEn ■ i Gos, international law, and nGos