Intergovernmental Organ izations 213
While all international prob lems are not collective- goods prob lems, most inter-
national issues require continuous interactions among parties— hence, over the long
term, states find it mutually beneficial to cooperate, especially if the costs of ensuring
transparency, reducing cheating, and punishing the uncooperative are relatively low.
the roles of Igos
Intergovernmental organ izations, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and
the International Civil Aviation Or ga ni za tion, can play key roles at each level of analy-
sis.^4 In the international system, IGOs contribute to habits of cooperation; states
become socialized to regular interactions, such as through the United Nations.
Some programs of IGOs, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency’s nuclear-
monitoring program, establish regularized pro cesses of information gathering, analy-
sis, and surveillance. Some IGOs, such as the World Trade Or ga ni za tion, develop
procedures for making rules, settling disputes, and punishing those who fail to follow
the rules. IGOs may also play key roles in international bargaining, facilitating the
formation of transgovernmental and transnational networks, sometimes leading to
common expectations of states’ be hav ior. We know these rules and princi ples generally
as international regimes. Charters of IGOs incorporate the norms, rules, and decision-
making pro cesses of regimes. By bringing members of the regime together, IGOs help
to reduce the incentive to cheat and enhance the value of a good reputation.
For states, IGOs both enlarge the possibilities for foreign policy making and add to
the constraints under which states conduct and, in par tic u lar, implement foreign pol-
icy. States join IGOs to use them as instruments of foreign policy. IGOs may legitimate
a state’s viewpoints and policies— thus, the United States sought the support of the
Or ga ni za tion of American States during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. IGOs
increase available information about other states, thereby enhancing predictability in
the policy- making pro cess. Some IGOs, such as the UN High Commissioner for Refu-
gees and UNICEF, may conduct specific activities that are compatible with, or aug-
ment, state policy.
But IGOs also constrain member states by setting international and hence national
agendas and forcing governments to make decisions or develop implementation pro-
cesses to coordinate IGO participation. Both large and small states may have to align
their policies if they wish to benefit from their membership.
IGOs also affect individuals by providing opportunities for leadership. As indi-
viduals work with or in IGOs, they, like states, may become socialized to cooperate
internationally.
Not all IGOs perform all of these functions, and the manner in and extent to which
each carries out par tic u lar functions varies. Sometimes, the failure of one organ ization
to perform its functions leads to its replacement by another organ ization that tries a