ities and coped with the disruptions from the Arab Spring. But, although the Security
Council has enormous formal power, it does not have direct control over the means to
use that power. It depends on states for funding, personnel, and enforcement of sanc-
tions and military action. A state’s willingness to contribute depends on whether it
perceives the council as legitimate.
The General Assembly is the main deliberative body of the United Nations and
permits debate on any topic under its purview. All member states are represented in the
General Assembly, which has grown in membership from 51 in 1946 to 193 in 2016.
The bulk of the work of the General Assembly is done in six functional committees:
Disarmament and Security; Economic and Financial; Social, Humanitarian, and
Cultural; Po liti cal and Decolonization; Administrative and Bud getary; and Legal.
Debate on resolutions emerging from the committees is or ga nized around regionally
based voting blocs, with member states using their one vote to coordinate positions
and build support for them. Since the end of the Cold War, the General Assembly’s
work has been increasingly marginalized, as the epicenter of UN power has shifted
back to the Security Council and a more active Secretariat. This marginalization has
happened much to the dismay of vari ous caucusing groups, including the Group of
77 , the co ali tion of developing states; regional groups (Africa, Asia, Latin Amer i ca);
and some members of the Group of 20, a co ali tion of the emerging economies. Occa-
sionally, the work of the General Assembly attracts public attention, as it did during the
2011 and 2012 debates over the status of Palestine, but generally, it provides a forum for
member states to express positions and conduct the UN’s house keeping functions.
The Secretariat has expanded to employ a global staff of around 43,000 with about
one- quarter located at UN headquarters. The role of the secretary- general has expanded
significantly. Having few formal powers, the secretary- general depends on persuasive
capability and an aura of neutrality for authority. With this power, the secretary- general,
especially in the post– Cold War era, can potentially forge an activist agenda, as
Secretary- General Kofi Annan did until his retirement in 2006. In 1998, he negoti-
ated a compromise between Iraq and the United States over the authority, composition,
and timing of UN weapon inspections in Iraq; he mediated between Iraq and the rest
of the international community; he also implemented significant administrative and
bud getary reforms and worked hard to establish a better relationship with the U.S.
Congress. Annan used the office to push other initiatives, including the international
response to the AIDS epidemic and the promotion of better relations between the pri-
vate sector and the United Nations. A highly vis i ble secretary- general, he was awarded
the Nobel Peace Prize in 2001.
His successor, Ban Ki- moon of the Republic of Korea, was reelected to a second
term in 2011. In the early years, he took initiatives on climate change, Darfur, and
preventive diplomacy, and in the second term, vio lence against women, LGBT rights,
natu ral- disaster risk reduction, as well as climate change. In pressing for management
218 CHAPTER SEvEn ■ IGOs, InternatIOnal law, and nGOs