Intergovernmental Organ izations 225Estimates show that the sanctions resulted in a 25 percent decline in Iran’s GDP
between 2012 and 2014. But getting agreement on when to impose sanctions, espe-
cially multilateral sanctions like those imposed on Iran, can be difficult, as explained in
Chapter 5. In this case, those sanctions appeared to be a major factor leading Iran to
the negotiating table with the P5 +1 and EU in 2014 and 2015, culminating in the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action announced in July 2015.
Taking military action is another enforcement mechanism. The 1991 Gulf War was
an enforcement action under Chapter VII. The Security Council authorized members
“to use all necessary means,” a mandate that led to direct military action by the multi-
national co ali tion under U.S. command. In 2002, the United States went to the Secu-
rity Council seeking Chapter VII enforcement against Iraq again, claiming that Iraq
was in material breach of its obligations under previous UN resolutions. The Security
Council was divided, with the United States and Great Britain supporting enforcement
and France, Rus sia, and China opposing the action. When the stalemate solidified, the
United States chose not to return to the Security Council to seek formal authorization
for the use of force. Thus, the U.S.- led co ali tion in the 2003 Iraq War was not autho-
rized by the United Nations, leading many to ponder whether the United Nations was
still a relevant player in international politics.
PeacekeePIng and enfOrcement: SucceSS Or faIlure?
What defines success in peacekeeping and enforcement? The end of fighting? The end
of a humanitarian crisis? A peace agreement? For how long does the success have to
last? Two years, five, or more? Does success include holding free elections? Establish-
ing a viable rec ord of human rights and achieving economic development? And who
defines success? The local population, who may define success in being able to return
home? The belligerents, who may be negotiating a cease- fire? The individuals who want
to return home to the troop- contributing country? Or does the UN secretary- general,
who wants to achieve the mission’s stated mandates, define the success?
Case studies of specific conflicts tend to show that traditional peacekeeping has
been successful. The Cyprus peacekeeping mission averted overt hostilities between
Greeks and Turks on the island. For 11 years, the Arab and Israeli states were kept apart,
and India- Pakistan hostilities over Kashmir were contained to intermittent intervals,
thanks in large part to traditional peacekeeping operations. Unfortunately, in all three
situations, traditional peacekeeping alone could make the peace but not keep it.
Scholarly studies using empirical data from multiple cases confirm that multi-
dimensional complex operations have reduced the risk of war by half; the risk of another
war occurring within five years ranged from 23 to 43 percent. But enforcement mis-
sions have been more associated with unstable peace. There is a disturbing rate of con-
flict recurrence, estimated at between 20 percent and 56 percent for all civil conflicts.^7