When those complex operations involved verification of arms, monitoring, or election
supervision, they were more successful. But, in the most difficult conflicts, with a long
history of vio lence and multiple belligerents, peacekeeping and peacebuilding have
been less successful, as the Demo cratic Republic of Congo case illustrates.
Because of the Congo quagmire, and more recently in UN operations in Mali,
Central African Republic (CAR), and the Republic of South Sudan, significant con-
cerns are being raised about the line between peacekeeping and enforcement. Does
the UN’s targeting of “an enemy” substantially reduce its impartiality and undermine
its legitimacy? In the Congo, the authorization of the Force Intervention Brigade to
“neutralize and disarm” a specific militia; the mandate to conduct war against Al Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb and liberation movements and or ga nized crime in Mali; and
authorization in the CAR to stop the ethnic cleansing of Christian groups against
Muslims may amount to a “doctrinal change,” with multiple ramifications.^8
The effectiveness of sanctions may be even more difficult to evaluate. Is it primarily
sanctions, or something else, that induce compliance (see Chapter 5)? In a globalized
economic system, for sanctions to be successful, they clearly need to be multilateral. If
there is agreement among the permanent members of the Security Council, multilat-
eral sanctions can be a power ful weapon.
UN RefoRm: SUcceSS aNd Stalemate
Faced with escalating demands for the UN to act across a number of issues, con-
fronted by the realization that the UN has rarely lived up to the expectations of all its
members, and saddled with structures that no longer reflect the power realities of the
international system, the United Nations has been confronted with per sis tent calls for
reform. Although many reforms have been undertaken, the challenges remain critical.
Because amending the charter is difficult— requiring ratification of two- thirds of the
members, including all five permanent members of the Security Council— the UN
has undertaken most reforms without actually amending the charter.
To address management prob lems— such as those publicized by the 2004 oil- for- food
scandal, when UN officials were accused of taking bribes— new financial accountability
mechanisms and internal oversight have been established. To address new transnational
concerns, structures have been created or reor ga nized, including the High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights in 1997 and the Counter- Terrorism Committee in 2001, to
help countries become more effective in addressing terrorism. To manage peacekeeping
operations more efficiently, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has been
expanded; a Department of Field Support has been or ga nized to address financial, logisti-
cal, and information issues; military staff has been added from the troop- contributing
countries; and rapid deployment teams have been or ga nized. Since 2006, the Peacebuild-
ing Commission had addressed post- conflict recovery issues, including monitoring
226 CHAPTER SEvEn ■ IG oS, INteRNatIoNal law, aNd NGoS