Intergovernmental Organ izations 239The newly reconstituted AU is an attempt to give African states an increased abil-
ity to respond to the issues of economic globalization and demo cratization affecting
the continent. Thus, the AU is committed to good governance and demo cratic
princi ples, suspending illegitimate governments, pledging to intervene in the affairs of
members should genocide and crimes against humanity occur, and adopting mea sures
to strengthen monitoring under the African Peer Review mechanism. Such promises
are predicated on the belief that better governance is key to economic development
and necessary for external development funds. However, although the AU did suspend
Mauritania from membership (2008), impose sanctions on Togo (2005), reverse a
coup in the Comoros Islands (2008), and impose sanctions on and suspend Burkina
Faso in 2014 following a coup, it has not taken additional mea sures. The AU also has
not acted in the Zimbabwe crisis, despite its own findings of major human rights
abuses in 2007 and evidence of election fraud in 2008.
But beginning in 2007, under UN Security Council authorization, the African
Union Mission in Somalia has remained an AU operation with 22,000 uniformed
personnel from Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Uganda, supplemented by
NATO airlifts and UN and EU funding. While the force has helped to stabilize the
transitional government and expanded the portions of the country under government
control, it has suffered thousands of battlefield deaths, the precise figure being unknown.
Following through on obligations and enforcement remains a prob lem not only for
the OAS and the AU but also for most regional organ izations because funding is limited
and commitment waxes and wanes.
An example of varying commitment over time is illustrated by the League of Arab
States. Established in 1945, the only action the league undertook for many years was
to oppose Israel. Enforcement of the official boycott of Israeli goods and companies
since 1948 has been lax and its effects on trade limited. Also, because of internal dis-
putes among members, the league did not coordinate on policy regarding the wars
with Israel in 1948, 1967, or 1973, and it stayed silent during the conflict between
Israel and Hamas in Gaza in 2014.
Following the initial shock of the Arab Spring of 2011, the Arab League seized the
opportunity and took initiative, taking the unpre ce dented step of suspending Libyan,
Syrian, and Yemeni membership, calling for multilateral action, and condemning the
respective governments for their use of force. In the case of Syria, the league sent in a
multilateral observer mission and called for the peaceful transfer of power. When that
mission failed, the league imposed sanctions on Syria, including freezing assets and
halting bank transfers. Yet the league has had very little leverage over Syria as the war
continues. These activities represent a major change in orga nizational be hav ior, as the
league interfered in a member state’s domestic politics and called for a demo cratic
transition. In 2015, league members agreed in princi ple to form a joint military force.