The Causes of War 273port g oing to war because they themselves will bear the costs of war— paying with
their lives (in the case of soldiers), the lives of friends and family, and taxes. Demo
cratic states are thus especially unlikely to go to war with each other, because the
citizens in each state can trust that the citizens in the other state are as disinclined to
go to war as they are. According to liberals, this mitigates the threat that a demo
cratic opponent represents, even one with greater relative power. But by this logic,
the corollary is true also: citizens in demo cratic states tend to magnify the threat of
nondemo cratic states in which the government is less constrained by the public’s will,
even when such states appear to have a lesser capacity to fight and win wars. More
broadly, democracies engage in war only periodically, and only when the public and
their chosen leaders deem it necessary to maintain security.
Other liberal tenets hold that some types of economic systems are more suscep
tible to war than others are. Liberal states are likely to be states whose citizens enjoy
relative wealth. Such socie ties feel little need to divert the attention of dissatisfied
masses to an external conflict; the wealthy masses are largely satisfied with the status
quo. And even when they are not satisfied presently, liberal economies are marked
by the possibility of upward economic (and social) mobility: in a liberal state, even
the poorest person may one day become one of the richest. Liberals argue that such
conflicts as do arise can be limited by altering terms of trade, or by other concessions
short of outright war. Furthermore, war interrupts trade, blocks profits, and causes
inflation. Thus, liberal cap i tal ist states are more likely to avoid war and promote peace.
But not every theorist sees the liberal state as benign and peace loving. Indeed, radi
cal theorists offer the most thorough critique of liberalism and its economic counter
part, capitalism. They argue that cap i tal ist, liberal modes of production inevitably
lead to competition for economic dominance and po liti cal leadership between the two
major social classes within the state— the bourgeoisie ( middle classes) and the prole
tariat (workers). This strug gle leads to conflict, both internal and external, because the
state, dominated by an entrenched bourgeoisie, is driven to accelerate the engine of
capitalism at the expense of the proletariat and for the economic preservation of the
bourgeoisie.
This view attributes conflict and war to the internal dynamics of cap i tal ist economic
systems, which stagnate and slowly collapse in the absence of external stimulation. Three
diff er ent explanations have been offered for why they must turn outward. First, the
British economist John A. Hobson claimed that the internal demand for goods would
slow down in cap i tal ist countries, leading to pressures for imperialist expansion to find
external markets to sustain economic growth. Second, according to Lenin and other
Marxists, the prob lem is not underdemand but declining rates of return on capital.
Cap i tal ist states expand outward to find new markets; expanding markets increase the
rates of return on capital investment. Third, Lenin and many later twentieth century
radicals point to the need for raw materials to sustain cap i tal ist growth; states require