Karen_A._Mingst,_Ivan_M._Arregu_n-Toft]_Essentia

300 CHAPTER EigHT ■ War and Strife

permanent feature of interstate politics so long as anarchy persists. This formulation at
least hints at a possibility that states might eliminate war if a single state could amass
sufficient power to defeat all other states. Because this possibility is remote, neorealists
effectively share the pessimism of classical realists: as a prominent feature of interstate
politics, war can never be transcended.
One key concept that informs realism is the prisoner’s dilemma (see Chapter 3), a
conflict of interest structured in such a way that rational actors choose to harm each
other as a best strategy for avoiding a worse outcome. Another key concept is the secu-
rity dilemma, in which even actors with no hostile or aggressive intentions may be led
by their own insecurity into a costly and risky arms race. As the po liti cal scientist John
Herz described it, “Striving to attain security from attack, [states] are driven to acquire
more and more power in order to escape the power of others. This, in turn, renders the
others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever
feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and
the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on.”^27 The security dilemma,
then, results in a permanent condition of tension and power conflicts among states,
even when none actually seek conquest and war.
Although realism itself imagines intra- and interstate warfare as enduring features
of international politics, realists advance impor tant arguments about how to decrease
the frequency and intensity of wars once they break out. Power balancing is the first
approach. The core logic of power balancing is simple: when power is unbalanced, stron-
ger actors will be tempted to use their advantage to secure still more power. The greater
the imbalance, the greater the temptation. This is because, for the stronger actor, the
costs and risks of war seem low in comparison to potential gains, thus making war a
rational strategy. But when aggressive, insecure, or greedy actors face others with rela-
tively equal power, they are likely to hesitate to go to war because the costs of war are
more likely to exceed expected benefits. Realism’s logic therefore explains much of what

t able 8.3

approacheS to Managing inSecurity

Realist libeRal

Approach

Reliance on force or

threat of force to

manage power

international institutions

coordinate actions to manage

power

Policies Balance of power; Deterrence

Collective security; Trade

liberalization; Arms control

and disarmament