302 CHAPTER EigHT ■ War and Strife
Union maintained a relative balance of power. If one of the superpowers augmented
its power through the expansion of its alliances or through the acquisition of deadlier,
more effective armaments, the other responded in kind. Absolute gains were not as
critical as relative gains; no matter how much total power one state accrued, neither
state could afford to fall behind the other. Gaining allies among uncommitted states
in the developing countries through foreign aid or military and diplomatic interven-
tion was one way to ensure they balanced the power. Not maintaining the power bal-
ance was too risky a strategy since both sides tended to believe their national survival
was at stake.
Balances of power among states in specific geographic regions are also a way to man-
age insecurity. In South Asia, for example, a balance of power maintains a tense peace
between India and Pakistan— a peace made more durable by the presence of nuclear
weapons, according to realist thinking. In East Asia, Japan’s alliance with the
United States creates a balance of power with China. In the Middle East, a balance of
power between Israel and its Arab neighbors continues. In some regions, a complex set
of other balances has developed: between the eco nom ically rich, oil- producing states
of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf and the eco nom ically poor states of the core
Middle East; and between Islamic militants (Iran), moderates (Egypt, Tunisia), and
conservatives (Saudi Arabia). With the breakup of the Soviet Union, the newly in de-
pen dent states of Central Asia are struggling for position within a newly emerging
regional balance of power that includes both Rus sia and China.
Realist theorists assert that balancing power is the most impor tant technique for
managing insecurity. It is compatible with human nature and the nature of the state,
which is to act to protect one’s self- interest by maintaining one’s power position
relative to that of others. If a state seeks preponderance through military acquisi-
tions or offensive actions, then war against that state is acceptable under the balance-
of- power system. If all states act similarly, the balance can be preserved without war.
One major limitation of the balance- of- power approach, however, is its requirement
that states view established friendships with allies as expendable. According to the
theory, should power shift, alliances should also shift to maintain the balance—
regardless of friendship. But as liberals and constructivists observe, states exist in a
kind of society and they resist giving up their “friends,” even when power shifts. This
idea may explain why, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, long- standing U.S.
allies such as Britain did not abandon their alliance with the United States, even
though the bipolar balance of power had collapsed.
A second limitation stems from the inability to manage security during periods of
rapid change. A balance- of- power approach supports the status quo. When change
occurs, or if the status quo comes to be perceived as unjust, how should other states
respond? Rapid change occurred at the end of the Cold War, for example, with the