Contending Perspectives on Managing Insecurity 303dismemberment of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact alliance.
A balance- of- power strategy would have suggested that U.S. allies re- align to fill the
power vacuum left by the USSR’s demise. Instead, the United States attempted, with
mixed success, to lead its allies into a series of escalating confrontations with what it
considered “dictatorships” and “supporters of terror.” After 2005, the United States’
Eu ro pean allies began to balance against U.S. hegemony and unilateralism; however,
their effort was stalled by the financial crisis of 2008 and the election of a more cir-
cumspect U.S. president, Barack Obama, who preferred multilateral approaches.
DeterrenCe
Although the subject of deterrence has its own lit er a ture, it is best understood in rela-
tion to the balance of power as the mechanism that enables a balance of power to cause
peace. At its most basic level, deterrence is the manipulation of fear to prevent an
unwanted action. If I am much bigger than you are, I can expect your fear of being
hurt or killed to deter you from attacking me. The same is true of a balance of power:
when power is balanced, fear of being defeated in war is expected to keep aggressive
states from attacking. By contrast, when a rapidly rising state threatens the balance
of power, its confidence of victory may tempt it to war. Thus, deterrence is how bal-
ancing power works to reduce the likelihood of war.
Deterrence theory posits that the credible threat of the use of force can prevent vio-
lence such as war. In its 2002 National Security Strategy, for example, the United States
made the threat very explicit for those who may pursue global terrorism. The United
States writes that it will defend “the United States, the American people, our interests
at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our
border.... We will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-
defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm
against our people and our country.”^29
Deterrence theory, as initially developed, is based on several key assumptions.^30 First,
the theory assumes that rational decision makers want to avoid resorting to war in those
situations in which the anticipated cost of aggression is greater than the expected gain.
Second, the theory assumes that nuclear weapons— one particularly intense form of
harm— pose an unacceptable risk of mutual destruction, and thus, that decision makers
will not initiate armed aggression against a nuclear state. Third, the theory assumes that
alternatives to war are available to decision makers, irrespective of the issue of contention.
For deterrence to work, then, states must form alliances or build up their arsenals
to pres ent a credible threat. Information regarding the threat must be conveyed to the
opponent. Knowing that a damaging reaction will counter an aggressive action, the
opponent will decide not to resort to force and thereby destroy its own society.