304 CHAPTER EigHT ■ War and Strife
As logical as deterrence sounds, and as effective as it seemed during the Cold War—
after all, no nuclear war occurred between the superpowers— the very assumptions on
which deterrence is based are frequently subject to challenge. Are all top decision mak-
ers rational? Might not one individual or a group of individuals risk destruction in
deciding to launch a first strike? Might some states be willing to sacrifice a large num-
ber of people, as Germany’s Adolf Hitler, Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini, and Iraq’s Saddam
Hussein were willing to do in the past? How do states credibly convey information about
their true capabilities to a potential adversary? Should they? Or would it make more
sense to bluff or to lie? For states without nuclear weapons, or for nuclear- weapons states
that are launching an attack against a nonnuclear state, the risks of war may seem
acceptable: when one’s own society is unlikely to be threatened with destruction (as in
most asymmetric conflicts), deterrence is more likely to fail.
The security environment makes deterrence even more problematic in the new
millennium. First, the rise of terrorism conducted by nonstate actors appears to
decrease the possibility that deterrence will work. Because nonstate actors do not
hold territory, the threat to destroy such territory in a retaliatory strike cannot be
a potent deterrent. Flexible networks— such as Al Qaeda— spread over diff er ent
geographic areas, rather than an orga nizational hierarchy located within a par tic u lar
state, make eliminating those networks very difficult. The increasing willingness of
some groups to use suicide terrorism to achieve their objectives has made the logic
of deterrence appear particularly shaky. Deterrence depends on the calculation that
rational actors will never deliberately act to invite costly reprisals, yet suicide terror-
ists are willing to sacrifice their own lives. Since loss of life has traditionally been
thought of as the highest of all costs, suicide terrorism appears to render deterrence
meaningless.^31
Second, in the changed security environment, the United States may be approach-
ing nuclear primacy.^32 For the first time in nuclear history, the United States may be
able to destroy the long- range nuclear arsenals of both Rus sia and China with a first
aSSumptionS of
deterrence theory■ Decision makers are rational.
■ The likelihood of escalation to mutual
destruction from warfare is high.■ Alternatives to war are available.
■ Attempts to deter insecure states
may backfire.i n focuS