410 CHAPTER ElEvEn ■ TransnaTional issues
did acknowledge wars, famine, or moral restraint as ways to check excessive population.^5
Three centuries later, The Limits to Growth, an in de pen dent report issued by the Club of
Rome in 1972, systematically investigated trends in population, agricultural produc-
tion, natu ral resource utilization, and industrial production, as well as pollution and the
intricate feedback loops that link these trends. Its conclusion was pessimistic: the earth
would reach natu ral limits to population growth within a relatively short time.^6
Neither Malthus nor the Club of Rome proved to be correct. Malthus did not fore-
see the technological changes that would lead to much higher rates of food produc-
tion, nor did he predict the demographic transition— that population growth rates
would not proceed unchecked. Although improvements in economic development led
at first to lower death rates and hence to a greater population increase, over time, as
the lives of individuals improved, women became more educated, people moved to
urban areas, and birthrates dropped dramatically. The advent of safe, reliable birth-
control technologies also led to a decline in birthrates. Likewise, the Club of Rome’s
predictions proved too pessimistic, as technological change stretched resources beyond
the limits predicted in its 1972 report.
Although Malthus and the Club of Rome missed some key trends, their prediction
that the world’s population would increase dramatically has proved correct. The pop-
ulation has increased from 800 million in 1776 to 7.3 billion in 2015. The UN esti-
mates that by the end of the twenty- first century, the global population will reach 11.2
billion. (See Table 11.2.) In fact, the relative rate of growth of the world’s population
has declined, much faster than expected.
Several key observations make population and population growth rates cause for
concern. First, the population increase is not uniformly distributed. Women in low-
income countries averaged 4.8 births in 2013; in middle- income areas, fertility was
2.4 births, and in high- income states, fertility averaged 1.7 births per female, due
to the demographic transition. There are significant differences among low- a nd
middle- income geographic regions, from 1.9 births in East Asia and the Pacific; 2.7
births in the Middle East and North Africa; to 5.1 births per female in sub- Saharan
Africa. Clearly, a significant demographic divide exists between the rich with low
population growth rates and the poorer states, particularly in Africa, with higher
population growth rates. These divides have po liti cally sensitive consequences, as
poor states labor under the burden of the population explosion while attempting to
meet the economic consumption standards of the rich states of North Amer i ca and
Eu rope.
Realists see two threats emerging from these demographic trends that could desta-
bilize the balance of power. First, states with burgeoning populations and insufficient
food might seek to expand their territory or acquire food by means of war. Second,
surplus males, who might other wise turn to domestic crime or destabilize the state from
within, might be channeled into state militaries and “expended” in aggressive interstate