technology. As one famous apologist for colonialism put it: “Thank God that we have
got the Maxim gun, and they have not.”^6
But, as the nineteenth century drew to a close, the assumption that imperialist coun-
tries could cheaply control vast stretches of distant territory containing large numbers of
aggrieved or oppressed people with only a few colonial officers and administrators was
being challenged with increasing frequency. For Great Britain, the world’s most success-
ful colonial power, the future of colonialism was clearly signaled by Britain’s Pyrrhic
victory in the Second Anglo- Boer War (1899–1902; also known as the South African
War). British soldiers fought, against Boer commandos (white descendants of Dutch
immigrants to South Africa in the 1820s), a lengthy and bitter counterinsurgency war
that claimed the lives of more than 20,000 Boer women and children through the fail-
ure of the British to provide sanitary internment conditions, sufficient food, and fresh
water. The war, which Britain expected to last no longer than three months and cost no
more than 10 million pounds sterling, ended up costing 230 million pounds and last-
ing two years and eight months. It proved the most expensive war, by an order of mag-
nitude, in British colonial history. The war was largely unpopular in Eu rope and led to
increased tensions between Britain and Germany, because the Boers had purchased
advanced infantry rifles from Germany and sought German diplomatic and military
intervention during the war. However, the five Eu ro pean powers had still not fought
major wars directly against each other.
In sum, much of the competition, rivalry, and tension traditionally marking rela-
tions among Eu rope’s states could be acted out far beyond Eu rope itself. Eu ro pe ans
raced to acquire colonies to achieve increased status, wealth, and power vis- à- vis their
rivals. Eu ro pe ans could imagine themselves as bringing the light of civilization to the
“dark” regions of the world, while at the same time acquiring the material resources
(mineral wealth and “native levies”) they might need in a future war in Eu rope. Each
colonial power understood it might take years to accumulate sufficient resources to gain
an advantage in a major Eu ro pean war. Therefore, each state maintained an interest in
managing crises so conflicts of interest would not escalate to all- out war. Thus, the
“safety valve” of colonialism both reinforced Eu ro pean unity and identity and prevented
the buildup of tension in Eu rope.
By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the toll of po liti cal rivalry and eco-
nomic competition had become destabilizing. Germany’s unification, rapid industri-
alization, and population growth led to an escalation of tension that could not be
assuaged in time to prevent war. In 1870, France and Germany fought a major war, in
which France suffered defeat. Through a humiliating peace treaty, France was forced to
surrender the long- contested provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, which became part of
the new Germany. The war and the simmering resentments to which it gave birth were
mere harbingers of conflicts to come. In addition, the legacy of colonialism, which had
served to defuse tension in Eu rope, laid the groundwork for enduring resentment of34 CHAPTER Two ■ Historical context of international relationsESSIR7_CH02_020_069_11P.indd 34 6/14/16 10:01 AM