The Economist UK - 07.09.2019

40 United States The EconomistSeptember 7th 2019

I

n the shadowof the Rocky Mountains,

at Peterson air force base in Colorado

Springs, an officer of the usAir Force Space

Command clutches a metallic object

scarcely larger than a Rubik’s Cube. “If we

lose this cubesat in orbit,” he explains, “it

could be someone else’s attack vehicle.” In

the past, satellite operators—like those

controlling gps satellites from nearby

Schriever air force base—would have

blamed problems on space weather or

communication glitches. Now their minds

leap to hacking, jamming and deliberate

collision. And so on August 29th, after con-

gressional instruction a year ago, President

Donald Trump unveiled a new Space Com-

mand, with operational control of nearly

all American space assets. He promised

that a Space Force, the first new military

service since the air force was established

in 1947, would follow.

The distinction between command and

service is important. Since the Goldwater-

Nichols Act in 1986, America’s armed forces

have been cleaved into two parts. Individ-

ual services train and equip their respec-

tive forces, but do not send them into bat-

tle. Instead 11 so-called combatant

commands divvy the world up into six geo-

graphical chunks and five functional areas

such as cyber, special operations—and

now space. The head of each one controls

all the forces within his or her fief, whatev-

er their service. Thus the admiral who runs

the Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii rules

over infantrymen in South Korea, air-force

pilots in Japan and marines in Australia.

The system was designed specifically to

avoid the sorts of inter-service quarrels

that contributed to a botched hostage-res-

cue mission in Iran in 1980.

For some years, space sat awkwardly in

this structure. There was a dedicated Space

Command between 1985 and 2002. But

after the September 11th attacks an empha-

sis on homeland defence led to the creation

of a new Northern Command, covering

North America. Space was kicked into Stra-

tegic Command, whose primary job is nuc-

lear weapons. There was some logic to this:

America’s most vital satellites are those

which watch for missile launches, detect

nuclear detonations and pass orders from

the president to nuclear forces.

But as space threats seemed to grow—

China’s test of an anti-satellite missile in

2007 was the first by any country since

1985—the arrangement looked proble-

matic. In 2014 a review of space policy by

the Obama administration concluded that

it was “critical” for America to be able to

identify threats in space and counter other

countries’ anti-satellite weapons. The

Trump administration intensified public

warnings of those vulnerabilities.

In February General John Hyten, com-

mander of Strategic Command, said that

space was his third priority, after the mod-

ernisation of nuclear forces and their com-

mand and control. “It really is important to

have someone who comes to work every

day and that’s all they think about—space

operations, space threats and defending

our space assets,” says Matthew Donovan,

the acting secretary of the air force. That job

now falls to General John “Jay” Raymond

(pictured). Notably, he will have wartime

control of the National Reconnaissance Of-

fice’s fleet of highly classified spy satellites

if they come under attack.

Not everyone is convinced that the reor-

ganisation is urgently needed. In an essay

published in July on “War on the Rocks”, a

website, Brian Weeden, a former space-op-

erations officer with the air force who is

now at the Secure World Foundation, a

think-tank, warned that General Raymond

might wind up clashing with geographical-

area commanders. If, for instance, China

jams American gpssignals during a war

over Taiwan, Space Command and Indo-

Pacific Command may disagree on how

best to respond. The Pentagon is examin-

ing how such co-ordination will work. Mr

Weeden also worries that a dedicated com-

mand might encourage those fixated on

“future battles in space”—satellite-on-sat-

ellite combat—rather than the more press-

ing task of using devices orbiting Earth to

help commanders wage war on its surface,

such as by sharpening gpssignals or redi-

recting spy satellites.

Before Space Command can get stuck

into cosmic battles, a more conventional

war over federal dollars has to be fought.

Mr Trump did not disclose which of six

shortlisted bases across three states—Ala-

bama, California and Colorado—would ac-

commodate Space Command..

The debate is then likely to shift to Mr

Trump’s Space Force, which, like the other

services, would train and equip the “space

warfighters” (as the Pentagon calls them)

for General Raymond’s command. The

White House has proposed a $500m-a-year

service that would sit demurely within the

air force, much as the marine corps is a

component of the navy. Mr Weeden says

that this, not Space Command, ought to

have been the priority. He points out that

there is a pressing need to train more space

experts; over a third of space billets at Stra-

tegic Command are said to be unfilled.

Congress is broadly in favour of the

force, although the Senate and House are

haggling over details. The Senate wants to

put off creating a fully-fledged service for

at least a year, to avoid bureaucratic bloat.

The Democrat-controlled House prefers a

less pugnacious label: Space Corps. What-

ever it is called, the aim is to inculcate a ga-

lactic esprit de corps. “When people join

the marines, it’s not about joining the

navy,” says Stephen Kitay, deputy assistant

secretary of defence for space policy.

“Somebody joins the marines and that’s in

their culture and dnaand ethos. And we’re

looking to create that for space.” 7

COLORADO SPRINGS

Donald Trump unveils Space Command but must wait for Space Force

War in space

The force awakens

Take me to your leader