The EconomistSeptember 7th 2019 United States 41A
fghans often celebrate auspicious events with volleys of
gunfire. The Taliban went one further on September 2nd by
detonating a suicide-bomb in Kabul just as an American diplomat,
Zalmay Khalilzad, was confirming the outline of the draft settle-
ment he has negotiated with the jihadist group. Up to 30 people
were reported killed in the blast. Half a dozen more were shot and
wounded by police in the protests that followed.
The violence underlined why the draft agreement, which
would cover an initial withdrawal of around 5,000 of America’s
14,000 troops in Afghanistan within five months, has been cau-
tiously welcomed by many sceptics. The Taliban control much of
the country, cannot be defeated and the war’s toll on Afghans is in-
tolerable. It also indicated how much America, 18 years after it
bombed the jihadists from power, has capitulated to them.
Mr Khalilzad, a former ambassador to Afghanistan, set three
conditions when launching peace talks with the militants in Doha
a year ago. America would consider withdrawing only if they
agreed to a ceasefire, recognised Afghanistan’s government as a
negotiating partner, and renounced their former alliance with al-
Qaeda. This offer was itself a significant climb-down.
Under George W. Bush, America refused to negotiate with the
Taliban. Under Barack Obama, it started to, but stopped after Af-
ghanistan’s government—at whose behest America claims to be
operating—objected. Donald Trump’s decision to revive the talks
over President Ashraf Ghani’s more vociferous protests was there-
fore a big concession to the militants, even if justified by their
strength. Yet Mr Khalilzad seems to have won little by this gamble.
Though he has released few details of the draft agreement, he
appears to have dropped all but his third condition. The Taliban
have agreed to participate in an intra-Afghan dialogue while the
Americans draw down, but have not recognised the government,
which has been excluded from the talks. Last weekend Mr Khalil-
zad let Mr Ghani read a copy of the draft, provided he hand it back
afterwards. As the slaughter in Kabul indicates, the militants have
also refused to countenance a ceasefire or discuss a more lasting
settlement. Beyond maintaining their commitment to re-estab-
lishing an Islamist regime, they have not indicated what power-
sharing or constitutional arrangement they might be willing to ac-
cept short of total victory. That raises obvious concerns about their
commitment to peace—without which it is hard to imagine how
their anticipated promise to cut their cord to foreign terrorists
could be verified, especially in the absence of American troops.
This is dispiriting but not surprising. As the war has dragged
on, the American government’s leverage over the Taliban has been
eroded by its floundering and their success. According to Ronald E.
Neumann, a former ambassador to Kabul, America has underta-
ken nine major policy shifts in Afghanistan—or three per sitting
president—since launching the war. Mr Bush was against nation-
building, then for it. Mr Obama ramped up the war, then ended it.
Mr Trump lambasted the war for years, seemed momentarily ener-
gised by the prospect of succeeding where his predecessor failed,
and now—aching for a foreign-policy win—may simply want the
troops out before next year’s election. No wonder the Taliban’s
leaders, at the helm of a profitable insurgency and confident of vic-
tory sooner or later, are not minded to compromise.
To stand a fair chance of arresting Afghanistan’s descent to civil
war, America will have to persuade the militants it has more stick-
ing-power than they think. Mr Khalilzad implies it is willing to. He
maintains the withdrawal will be “conditions-based”, which sug-
gests it could go into reverse if the Taliban do not get more enthusi-
astic about peacemaking. And indeed, Mr Trump has better cards
than the militants may imagine. With another 8,000 Western
troops in Afghanistan, the alliances that sustain America’s effort
look solid. Neighbouring Pakistan and China helped push the mil-
itants to the table. And America’s current level of commitment to
Afghanistan appears sustainable; Congress and the media general-
ly ignore the conflict.
There are two problems with this somewhat hopeful case. Mr
Trump may prefer to fold. His supporters want an end to America’s
wars almost as much as a border wall—and, having failed to wall
off Mexico, he may consider the former campaign promise easier
to keep. That would be consistent with an emerging paradox of his
presidency. His unorthodoxy has consistently created novel op-
portunities—a possible splurge on infrastructure at home; a peace
process with the Taliban abroad—that his personal shortcomings
make him especially unlikely to realise.
More fundamentally, ushering the Taliban and government to
the table, and keeping them there, would require a degree of politi-
cal nous and flexibility that America lacks above all else in Afghan-
istan. Its efforts have been disjointed, with soldiers, diplomats and
spies pushing conflicting priorities that only the faraway presi-
dent can adjudicate between. Hence the policy shifts, as Mr Bush
and his successors flitted from one recommendation to the next,
often in response to domestic pressures. The complex politics of a
country torn by war and ethnic rivalry, and between modernity
and tradition, have rarely penetrated that self-absorbed process.A republic, if they can keep it
The limited understanding of American political officers, cycled
in every six months or so, has made matters worse. Mr Neumann
recalls his unsuccessful effort to persuade Mr Ghani’s predecessor
to sack a provincial governor convicted of selling heroin in Ameri-
ca. It was months before the then ambassador learned that the
president owed a big favour to the drug-pusher’s father. Remem-
ber that next time you hear politicians cudgelling each other with
arguments for and against state-building. There is little recent evi-
dence that America is capable of it. Even the more modest task of
saving Afghanistan’s current shaky structure may be beyond it. 7Lexington Trumped by the Taliban
Donald Trump has created an opportunity for peace that he looks singularly unable to capitalise on