Global Times - 02.09.2019

Monday September 2, 2019 17

VIEWPOINT

Despite trade protectionism
and unilateralism continually
bringing unsettling news to
businesses around the world,
China never disappoints those
who are confident in its con-
sistent support of free trade,
as shown by its recent launch
of several new pilot free trade
zones (FTZs).
China’s State Council has
recently released an inspiring
plan to add another six new
pilot FTZs on top of its 12 al-
ready-existing ones and to flesh
them out in the provincial-level
regions of Shandong, Jiangsu,
Hebei, Guangxi, Yunnan and
Heilongjiang.
Now, China’s pilot FTZs
feature a deeper level of liberal-
ization and facilitation for for-

eign trade, capital, investment

and talent, and a wider level of

market access for foreign com-

panies, with a shortened nega-

tive list that prescribes their

off-limits.

Under that framework, new

pilot FTZs are given more au-

tonomy to experiment with

new patterns in transforming

government functions, manag-

ing foreign investment, facili-

tating foreign trade and attract-

ing global talent, based on their

differentiated advantages and

conditions.

For instance, the pilot FTZ

in Shandong is oriented toward

boosting marine economy and

economic cooperation among

East Asian countries, in Yun-

nan toward exploring modes of

cross-border economic cooper-

ation among China, South Asia

and Southeast Asia, in Guangxi

toward stepping up cooperation

with ASEAN countries, and in

Heilongjiang toward building

a transport and logistics hub to

facilitate cooperation with Rus-

sia and Northeast Asia.

The pilot FTZ in Jiangsu will

strengthen the interaction be-

tween the financial sector and

the real economy, while in He-

bei, biomedicine and health in-

dustries will be further opened

to global partners.

Geographically, the launch

of new pilot FTZs marks the

full coverage of coastal provin-

cial-level regions as well as the

inclusion of border regions into

the plan for the first time, tak-

ing China’s opening-up to a

broader level.

In general, new pilot FTZs

will strengthen global coopera-

tion in technology research and

development and pursue indus-

trial upgrade as a major task,

echoing the country’s mission

of economic transformation to

high-quality development.

China initiated piloting

FTZs in Shanghai in 2013, fol-

lowed by another 11 FTZs in its

coastal regions before the lat-

est expansion. In the first half

of this year, China’s 12 current

FTZs have attracted foreign

investment of nearly 70 billion

yuan (about $9.88 billion), ac-

counting for 14 percent of the

country’s total.

When free trade is fac-

ing severe challenge around

the world, with increasing

amounts of cross-border trade

deals canceled, tariffs imposed,

capital flow thwarted and talent

mobility blocked, it takes more

efforts than imagined to re-

store the global economy back

to a multilateral and mutually

beneficial state. Despite the dif-

ficulties, China will shoulder

its responsibilities as a major

economy, within and beyond its

free trade zones.

This is a commentary of the

Xinhua News Agency. opinion@

globaltimes.com.cn

Thwarting Huawei beyond US security concern

New pilot free trade zones to catalyze China’s high-quality opening-up

Editor’s Note: 
Today, cybersecurity has become a hot
topic worldwide, with Huawei and 5G
technology at the center of the storm.
How is cybersecurity connected with geo-
politics? In what way will cyber geopolitics
influence a country’s diplomacy? How to
establish effective diplomatic mechanism
in cyberspace? During the seminar “The
Geopolitics of Cyberspace: A Diplomatic
Perspective” organized by the Charhar
Institute on Monday, Global Times (GT)
reporter Li Qingqing talked to Shaun
Riordan (Riordan), director of the De-
partment for Diplomacy and Cyberspace
at the European Institute of International
Studies, on these issues.

GT: In your new book Cyberdiplomacy:
Managing Security and Governance in
Cyberspace, you have mentioned that
diplomacy is needed to manage the
problems in cyberspace. What is the
relationship between cyberspace and
geopolitics?
Riordan: I think we could identify
geopolitics and cyberspace in two ways.
One is the physical structure of cyber-
space, which includes cables, switching
stations and storage in the physical
world. But then, the virtual network is
built up in cyberspace itself. The virtual
network determines how you get access,
but also creates an inevitable complexity
and uncertainty.
In the physical network, for example,
about 80 percent of internet traffic
passes across the US, and that gives the
US an enormous advantage in terms of
surveillance. It also gives other coun-
tries an incentive to find new structures
to avoid that surveillance. There is a
concept called critical geopolitics, which
is a way of analyzing how each individu-
al actor experiences cyberspace. I think
this can demonstrate how these actors
behave and what they are going to do in
cyberspace.

GT: The US has been putting pressure
on China’s Huawei, and some say that
the US aims at a technological decou-
pling with China, or even a technologi-

cal cold war. In your

opinion, what is the

US purpose of sup-

pressing Huawei?

Riordan: To some extent, I think we

need to disconnect Huawei from the

trade conflict between China and the

US. I am not convinced that the US

problem with Huawei is a security

issue. I think the US problem with

Huawei is that for the first time, in the

case of the second phase of 5G, a non-

American or non-American ally country

is setting the international industrial

standards for a new technology. This

has not happened before. 

Now, Americans are trying to prevent

non-American companies from setting

international industrial standards. For

the US, this is more important than the

security issue, because it is eating into

the US hegemony in cyberspace. There

will be many examples of conflicts over

industrial standards in the future.

GT: How will the US pressure influence

Huawei, and how should the company

break through the blockade?

Riordan: The US has put direct pres-

sure on Huawei, trying to prevent US

component makers from selling key

components to Huawei, and prevent

Huawei from accessing Google’s An-

droid and downloading new updates of

Android. In that area, Huawei is simply

developing its own products.

Then, to some extent, the US

has backed off a little bit and

allowed American companies

to still sell components to Huawei. This

is bad for the US, because it means that

US influence is declining. Also, a lot of

countries are going to be torn because

either they can accept Huawei technol-

ogy for 5G – in which case they can

enjoy 5G early, cheaply and efficiently

and gain an economic advantage - or

they can say no to Huawei and wait

years and lose the advantage. So, I think

there will be a large number of coun-

tries which will go with Huawei anyway,

despite the American pressure.

GT: How will China-US disputes de-

velop in the area of cyberspace?

Riordan: We can see increasing tension

in China-US trade disputes, and cy-

berspace will reflect such tension. The

problem is that US President Donald

Trump once said the trade war is easy

for the US to win and then he found out

it is not. For a broad range of reasons, it

is very difficult for either side to make

concessions to the other. Once you put

tariffs on everything, you have to look

for different areas of leverage. And

there is a danger that one or both sides

will start thinking that cyberspace is an

area where they can put pressure on the

other. Although cyberspace may be a

better way than the other alternatives to

add pressure, it still has escalated into

risks.

GT: What should China do to have

more say and set up its own diplomatic

mechanism in cyberspace?

Riordan: The situation for China has

changed. China used to be a country

that was very conscious of the techno-

logical gap between it and the rest of

the world. Therefore, China’s priority

in cyberspace was to acquire technology

and to close that technological gap. But

now, China is moving into a position

where it is vulnerable to various kinds

of espionage and other cyber attacks. So

today, China’s interests are increasingly

in establishing stability in cyberspace

to enable it to further develop economi-

cally. Therefore, the aim of Chinese

diplomacy in cyberspace should be to

identify other partners who share in

China’s preferred outcomes, and dis-

cuss with them how to establish norms

of data protection, intellectual property

and limit cyberattack targets, etc. China

should have a conversation along those

lines. For example, at the moment,

conversations with Europeans would be

a good option for China.

GT: In what way can different countries

worldwide actualize a peaceful and

orderly cyberspace?

Riordan: Traditionally, diplomacy

operates by identifying shared preferred

outcomes in particular areas and reach-

ing agreements. Countries would do it

bilaterally and then they may bring in

another country. But it is a slow process

of building consensus upwards. Until

now, the problem we have in cyberspace

is that if you try to start in an ambitious

way and make everyone embrace an

agreement, then those key countries

would not agree. I think we need to be

more modest and slower. I have real-

ized that we need to construct norms or

international law in cyberspace exactly

the same way as we did in physical

space. It is a lengthy process, not some-

thing you accomplish overnight.

Page Editor:

yujincui@

globaltimes.com.cn

Illustration: Liu Rui/GT

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IALOGUE