24 Britain The EconomistAugust 31st 2019
2
A
ll partiesagree their first choice of
route to try to stop a no-deal Brexit
should be legislation. Yet after Boris
Johnson’s decision to suspend Parlia-
ment for almost five weeks, somemps
want to have in reserve a vote of no confi-
dence. Such a vote could lead to a govern-
ment of national unity (gnu) backed by a
cross-party majority ofmps. This “letter-
writing government”, under a caretaker
prime minister, might invite theeuto
extend the Brexit deadline of October 31st
to allow time for a general election or
another referendum.
Yet the obstacles to a gnu are large.
Proposing a vote of no confidence is not
the same as winning one. Even winning
one is complicated by the 2011 Fixed-
term Parliaments Act, which allows 14
days for another government to secure
confidence before an election must be
called. Mr Johnson would remain prime
minister during this period, and might
fix the date for an election after October
31st, allowing no-deal by default.
But the biggest roadblock is who
should lead a gnu. As opposition leader,
Labour’s Jeremy Corbyn insists he should
be prime minister. Yet as he learnt this
week, he will not easily win the support
of other opposition parties, let alone Tory
rebels. Jo Swinson, the Liberal Democrat
leader, argues that any gnu should be led
by a neutral grandee, such as the Conser-
vatives’ Ken Clarke or Labour’s Harriet
Harman. But Labour will not back this
idea if Mr Corbyn is not on board.
Andrew Blick of King’s College, Lon-
don, says history shows that Mr Corbyn
is wrong to claim that only the leader of
the opposition can become prime min-
ister. In1916 David Lloyd George ousted
Herbert Asquith to form a national gov-
ernment that lasted until 1922, only to
see Labour later displace his party. In 1931
the Tories joined a national government
under the Labour prime minister, Ram-
say MacDonald, but he was then dis-
owned by his own party. In 1940 the
Labour opposition told Neville Chamber-
lain, the Tory prime minister, that it
would join a national government only if
it was led by Winston Churchill, who
won the war but lost the 1945 election.
Gnus are common beasts in other
European countries. But as Benjamin
Disraeli said, “England does not love
coalitions”, an aphorism confirmed by
the recent one under David Cameron.
And there is a big flaw in all talk of gov-
ernments of national unity. What Brexit
reveals is a total lack of national unity.
Of gnus and other animals
National governments
All y ou need to k-know about governments of national unity
W-who’s w-who
Sources: Rallings and Thrasher; House of Commons; “British Electoral Facts 1832-2006” *Coalition Liberals
British governments
1900s 10s 20s 30s 40s 50s 70s60s 80s 90s 2000s 10s
Winston
Churchill
David Lloyd
George
Herbert
Asquith
Ramsay
MacDonald
Party with most seats
Coalition partners
Prime minister
*
General elections
David
Cameron
Conservatives Labour Liberals
Coalition/national governments
Coalition
government
damage Britain far more than the eu.
The impact on the British economy,
which is already teetering near recession,
could indeed be severe. The government’s
leaked “Operation Yellowhammer” analy-
sis talks of possible shortages of fresh food,
medicine and petrol, disruption to ports
and the risk of civil unrest, especially in
Northern Ireland, where trade across the
border could be severely hampered. Manu-
facturers fret about the effect on just-in-
time supply chains of tariffs and non-tariff
barriers. Farmers and fishers are worried
about duties on sheep, beef and fish ex-
ports. Service businesses and the nhstalk
of recruitment problems.
Brexiteers dismiss this as another “Pro-
ject Fear”, like the prophecies of doom be-
fore the June 2016 referendum which
turned out to be too gloomy. They concede
that there could be bumps in the road. But
they also claim that no-deal would end un-
certainty for businesses, be harmoniously
managed by all sides and lead quickly to a
new free-trade deal with the eu.
As Charles Grant of the Centre for Euro-
pean Reform, a think-tank, notes, the cha-
os around no-deal would in fact maximise
the uncertainty for businesses. Far from
being harmonious, it would be acrimoni-
ous, especially since Mr Johnson says he
would not pay the full £39bn ($48bn) Brexit
bill accepted by Mrs May. And an early trade
deal looks far-fetched. The euwould insist
on the Brexit bill, protection of eucitizens’
rights and an Irish backstop as prerequi-
sites. Any talks would be on a different le-
gal basis from Article 50, which governs the
current negotiations, requiring a fresh ne-
gotiating mandate, the unanimous approv-
al of eugovernments and ratification by
national and regional parliaments.
Given this, most mps are understand-
ably against no-deal. But can they stop it
happening? Next week they will return to
work after days of feverish exchanges over
what to do. They are helped by the fact that
Mr Bercow seems determined to exploit all
his power as Speaker to give mps a say, and
that Mr Johnson has a Commons majority
of just one. Yet they know that no-deal is
the default option in the absence of other
action and that, thanks to Mr Johnson’s
suspension of Parliament, time is short.
Many concede that no-deal Brexiteers are
better organised and more ruthless than
their opponents.
Maddy Thimont Jack of the Institute for
Government, another think-tank, reckons
mps have just enough time to legislate, if
they remain united. The plan is to ask Mr
Bercow for an emergency debate under
standing order 24 and use this to follow the
precedent of the Cooper-Letwin bill that
was passed in March. Back then, mps took
control of the Commons agenda for a day to
bring in the bill, which required the prime
minister to request an extension of the
original Brexit deadline of March 29th. mps
might also need to suspend standing order
48, which says only a minister may pro-
pose acts costing public money.
Ms Thimont Jack notes that the March
bill became law in less than five days. But
that was partly because Mrs May chose not
to obstruct it. Even if a similar bill passes
the Commons in a single day, as then, it is
hard to break a filibuster in the Lords,
where the timetable for debate is less easily
curtailed. Another problem is that any law
can require Mr Johnson only to ask for an
extension. He might do so on terms that al-
low him to refuse any offer from the eu,
though Brussels is keen to avoid any blame
for a no-deal Brexit.
These uncertainties make some mps
keen to consider a vote of no confidence in
Mr Johnson’s government. But that, too, is
fraught with difficulties (see box). So are
such options as trying to revoke the Article
50 Brexit application, for which there is
much less support in Parliament. The
harsh truth is that, although majorities of
both mps and voters are against a no-deal
Brexit, an idea not even floated by Brexi-
teers during the referendum campaign, the
timetable makes it tricky to stop, however
much Parliament tries. 7