New Internationalist – September 2019

Oceans

The Paracels are a separate island
group to the northwest of the Spratlys
claimed by China, Taiwan and Vietnam.
But they have been occupied by China
since 1974 when it took them by force
from then South Vietnam.

2

What are the conflicts between
the claimants?
Perhaps the most dangerous disputes
are those over sovereignty of the fea-
tures and their 12-nautical-mile territo-
rial seas. Governments are obligated and
domestically pressured to defend the sov-
ereignty of their national territory.
The overlap of EEZs and China’s
historic claim results in disputes over
fishing. On 9 June, there was a collision
between two fishing boats in the Philip-
pines’ EEZ – one a People’s Republic of
China-flagged vessel and one a Philip-
pines-flagged fishing boat, provoking
much popular fury in the Philippines. 
The main dispute over petroleum
resources is due to the overlap of China’s
historic claim with the EEZ claims of
Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam.
China has ‘persuaded’ foreign oil com-
panies not to explore in disputed waters
and Vietnam has tried to prevent Chinese
exploration in its EEZ.

3
So where does the US come in?
The US and China are engaged in a strug-
gle for dominance in the South China
Sea.  The other Southeast Asian claim-
ants are caught in the middle and trying
to hedge between the two. According to
Admiral Harry Harris, who was the US
navy’s Pacific Commander: ‘Beijing is
using its military and economic power to
coerce its neighbours and erode the free
and open international order.’^1
Moreover, the US and its support-
ers assert that China is destabilizing the
region by its island building and ‘milita-
rization’ of its occupied features, and its
illegal maritime claims and increasingly
assertive actions to enforce them.
But from China’s perspective, it is the
US that is destabilizing the region with its
forward deployed military, its shows of
force – including its ‘freedom of naviga-
tion operations’ (FONOPs) – and its intel-
ligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
probes against China in its ‘near shore’
waters.
The US has apparently made it its
mission to prevent China from intimidat-
ing its fellow claimants and to interpret

and enforce UNCLOS there.  However,

that US position is weakened by the fact

that it alone among the major maritime

powers has refused to ratify UNCLOS.

4

Who is militarizing the area?

China and the US often exchange accu-

sations that the other is militarizing the

South China Sea. ‘Militarization’ means

‘to give a military character to or to adapt

for military use’. Under this definition,

all the claimants to and occupiers of the

Spratly features ‘militarized them’ years

ago. Indeed, all have stationed military

personnel there and have built airstrips

and harbours that can accommodate

military aircraft and vessels. 

But China points out that the US –

unlike China – already has military

‘places’ if not bases bordering the Sea in

the Philippines and Thailand – and more

recently in Malaysia and Singapore for

its intelligence flights targeting China’s

submarines. The US has also increased

its military presence in the region as

well as its FONOPs challenging China’s

claims.  China sees these as ‘gunboat

diplomacy’ and argues that it is only pre-

paring to defend itself.

5

What is the likely way forward?

There is hope that China and its rival

regional claimants can come up with

a formal Code of Conduct that would

prevent conflicts and contain inci-

dents. To do so, they will have to over-

come significant disagreements on the

definition of the area to be covered by the

Code, its legal status and the method of

enforcement – if any.

But the China-US struggle for domi-

nance in the South China Sea is part

of a more fundamental contest that

is unlikely to fade away and may well

expand and even explode.  

The risk of dangerous incidents is

growing. The recent near-collision

between the US warship Decatur and a

Chinese warship is only the most recent

in a series of near misses.

A series of similar dangerous mili-

tary incidents between the US and the

Soviet Union was a stimulus for their

1972 ground-breaking Agreement on the

Prevention of Incidents on and over the

High Seas. Perhaps the time has come for

a similar US-China agreement. 

The most likely scenario is continued

struggle by China and the US for domi-

nance in the South China Sea and to win

over the hearts and minds of Southeast

Asian claimants. O

MARK J VALENCIA IS AN INTERNATIONALLY KNOWN

MARITIME POLICY ANALYST. HE WRITES REGULARLY

FOR THE SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST. HE WAS A

SENIOR FELLOW WITH THE US-BASED EAST-WEST

CENTER FOR 26 YEARS AND IS ADJUNCT SENIOR

SCHOLAR AT THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SOUTH

CHINA SEA STUDIES, HAIKOU, CHINA.

1 US Indo-Pacific Command, 2018,

nin.tl/Harris-speech

SEPTEMBER- OCTOBER 2019 33

CHINA

LAOS

THAILAND

CAMBODIA

TAIWAN

INDONESIA

PHILIPPINES

VIETNAM

BRUNEI

MALAYSIA

PARACEL

ISLANDS

South

China

Sea

SPRATLY

ISLANDS

China, Taiwan,

Malaysia, Brunei,

Philippines and

Vietnam claim

sovereignty over

all or parts of

these scattered

islands and reefs

ScarboroughShoal

Itu Abu Island

Reeinto artificial islandsfs China is building

TERRITORIAL CLAIMS

China Vietnam Philippines Malaysia Brunei

(Left) Chinese People’s

Republic soldiers

patrol the Paracel

Islands, also claimed

by Vietnam and

Taiwan. The US

asserts its military

dominance via naval

patrols and bases in

the region.

STRINGER /REUTERS

(Right) A cat’s cradle

of conflicting national

claims. China’s

‘ historic’ – and

disputed – nine-dash-

line is in red.