130 NOTES TO INTRODUCTION
identify the plasticity of the brain and its entanglement with social life, neuro-
scientists and their interlocutors open up neurobiology to politics. Some, for
example, depict normative social life (involving theory of mind, empathy, or kin-
ship) as more or less a reflection of the brain’s innately social character, raising
the question of how to account for what they elide or erase — the conflicts, strug-
gles, and inequalities in social relations. How do non- normative bodies, experi-
ences, and relations fit into the biosociality neuroscientists are keen to describe?
Others suggest that inequality literally shapes the brain, raising concerns over
how to conceive neurobiological subjects in relation to power.
8 I thank an anonymous reviewer for succinctly stating this as a key contribution
of this book, and Elizabeth Wilson (2004, 2010), who persuasively argues that
neuroscientific data is not monolithic, and that it can be mined for feminist and
queer insights.
9 On the incorporation of the brain into conceptions of the self, see, for example,
Fullagar 2009; Martin 2010; Pickersgill and Van Keulen 2012; Rose 2007.
10 Many feminists writing about the neurosciences have made this case, including
Fausto- Sterling 2012; Fine 2011; Joel 2014; and Jordan- Young 2010. Other cita-
tions can be found in chapter 1. While sex difference research has found new
life in brain imaging technologies, it is rooted in mid- twentieth- century neuro-
endocrinology that precedes the explosion of interest in neural plasticity and epi-
genetics. It relies on a conservative account of evolutionary biology, and it makes
claims about gender roles, largely based on animal models, that have for decades
been called into question by feminists. Although the resilience of this research
program should not be underestimated, in its extreme biological determinism it
could seem quaint in comparison to empirical and theoretical models of neural
plasticity and biosociality. But feminist critiques of sexed brain research suggest
the issue is not merely a lag in scientific progress. For a review, see chapter 1 and
Fine et al. 2013; Hyde 2014; Schmitz and Hoeppner 2014.
11 Inasmuch as the centrality of brain science affects not just theory but praxis,
not only intellectual life but also ordinary existence, it is no longer possible to
dismiss the brain. It is not simply that references to the brain are ubiquitous;
there is a lot at stake for many people, including “anyone implicated in dis-
cussions of morality, emotion, reason, intelligence, sanity, health, sexuality,
personality and character.” I argued this in an essay I called “The Neurocultures
Manifesto” (Pitts- Taylor 2012a). A manifesto ought to be prescriptive, but how
best to address these issues is not, in fact, as straightforward as a manifesto
requires.
12 Feminist scientists have stressed the changes in the life sciences that make possi-
ble a more dynamic, developmental, and situated view of organisms. See Asberg
and Birke 2010; Birke 1999; Oyama 2016; Thelan and Smith 2004.
13 As the conceptual boundaries between biological and social realms are eroding —
as scientists are increasingly moving to address sociological concerns and so-
cial theorists are increasingly engaging with biological matter — the question is