132 NOTES TO INTRODUCTION
Weasel (in press 2016); on neuroscience see E. Wilson (2004, 2010, 2015) and
Malabou (2008, 2012); on evolutionary theory see Grosz (2004, 2005).
21 With regard to the brain’s immanent multiplicity, I am thinking especially of
the work of Elizabeth Wilson (1998, 2004, 2010, 2015) and Catherine Malabou
(2008, 2012). While Malabou takes a fairly uncritical approach to contemporary
neuroscientific facts, Wilson does not; rather, she mines the paradoxes within
neuroscientific thought to find resources for feminist theory.
22 These include theorists influenced by the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guat-
tari, such as Brian Massumi (2002), William Connolly (2002, 2011), John Protevi
(2009, 2013), and Patricia Clough (2007).
23 See, for example, Claire Colebrook (2008) and William Connolly (2011).
24 Power’s relation to the body is also being rethought. While power can be con-
ceived as discursive, achieving its effects through representation, it is also
material, achieved through the transformations of matter. For example, when
technoscientific and biomedical practices refigure the body at the molecular
level, engineer and patent gene sequences, harvest organs, or clone embryos,
they not only denature human bodies but also extract biological life and capi-
talize it outside of the boundaries of the individual and the exclusively human.
The treatment of biological matter as information, and the acceleration of data-
driven mechanisms of governance and biocapital, suggests that power can work
not only through discipline but also through securitization. Whereas the former
shapes the subject by inscribing the body, the latter bypasses the individual sub-
ject in favor of generating, capitalizing, and managing statistical risk. Thus some
theorists are less concerned with the intersectional subject and more with the
production of populations through the informational and statistical management
of life (Clough 2010; Clough et al. 2015; Foucault 2009). This emphasis requires
attention to affect, understood as a “material intensity that emerges via the ‘in-
between’ spaces of embodied encounters” (Pedwell and Whitehead 2012, 116).
25 See Omar Lizardo (2007, 2014); David Franks (2010); and Loïc Wacquant (2015).
For a critical response see Pitts- Taylor (2012b, 2014, 2015).
26 Catherine Malabou (2008) simply declares herself a materialist in response to
criticisms of the neurosciences. Doug Massey (2002) accuses sociologists of
ignorance about biology; Lizardo (2014) makes a similar case. Rose and Abi-
Rached (2013) argue for a “third way” in contrast to the antineuro detractors,
who see neuroscience as biologically reductionist, and neuro evangelists, who
treat it as a font of biosocial knowledge. For my arguments in sociology see Pitts-
Taylor 2012b, 2013, 2014.
27 Among feminist materialists writing about the brain, some argue for new meth-
odologies that could better respect the brain’s diversity and dynamism (e.g., Joel
2014; Jordan- Young 2010; Rippon et al. 2014). They also argue for the brain’s
plastic and developmental character, its environmental embeddedness, and
its situatedness in the whole, experiential body (Einstein 2012; Fausto- Sterling
2012; Fausto- Stirling et al. 2000; Van Anders and Watson 2006). They approach