THE PHENOMENON OF BRAIN PLASTICITY 21Whose Work Is It?
The second concern I want to address is whether and how the brain’s plas-
ticity translates into agency. In what sense, precisely, is the plastic brain a
work? And, more important, whose work is it? There are a number of pos-
sibilities, including (but not limited to) (a) that the agency of plasticity be-
longs to the subject, (b) that it inhabits the biological body, or (c) that it lies
outside the body- subject entirely, for example, given to culture. The first
possibility, embraced by many popular guides to brain science, is that the
potential of neural plasticity is available to a subject who can modify her own
brain. Jeffrey Schwartz and Sharon Begley, for example, champion the possi-
bility of “self- directed neuroplasticity” (2002, 254). One can alter the avail-
ability of neurotransmitters through antidepressants and other drugs; in
the current age one is also told that it is possible to facilitate more efficient
synaptic connections, create new pathways, and even promote the growth
of new neurons.^ Modifications of the brain may address health problems,
such as mental illness, infertility, obesity, or dementia, to name a few ex-
amples, or enhance cognitive performance. Rose and Abi- Rached (2013)
describe such practices as a contemporary form of somaticization, where
the individual is pressed to optimize and enhance her biology as a matter
of personal management, wellness, and neoliberal citizenship. While there
are many ways in which individuals can now participate in transforming
their brains, the claim of self-^ directed neuroplasticity raises a number of
problems. It presupposes a version of dualism, not quite between mind and
body, but between the brain- as- mind that directs the action and brain- as-
body that is acted upon. It presumes personal ownership over the brain’s
capacities, as if the brain responds to (and only to) the desires of its body-
subject. It sees agency as a “fixed human property” (Malafouris 2008, 23)
under the command of an exclusively human subject.
Those who (like me) put far less stock in the intentional subject as the
master of her own biology nonetheless may find potential in plasticity. In
many accounts of plasticity the brain makes itself on its own, without guid-
ance or permission from a knowing subject. It changes without the subject’s
consciousness of, or control over, when or how it is being changed, and
according to certain models of cognition it does so without need of sym-
bolic representations or meanings. The brain that changes itself may be an