72 CHAPTER THREE
own brain as if performing the action oneself (but without actually doing
so); in other words, they are thought to simulate the action of the other
(Gallese and Goldman 1998). But mirroring is not meaningless imitation;
rather, researchers argue that the neurons also afford a grasp of another’s
intentions. The neurons seem to work with considerable specificity. For
example, some of the mirror neurons (described as “broadly congruent”
ones) that fire in the picking up an ice cream cone scenario described ear-
lier also reportedly fire when a research subject sees someone perform
something different but logically related or having the same goal as that
action, such as putting a cone up to her mouth (Iacoboni 2009). Research-
ers have observed what they think is mirror neuron activation even when
an action is only partially observed (for example, some of her arm motion
is obscured by a screen) but when the goal of her action is apparent (the
subject can see that the ice cream is within the other person’s reach). Mirror
neuron researchers see this as evidence of action understanding, whereby
the subject registers the other’s goal for action (Iacoboni et al. 2005). This
intentional attunement is thought to be precognitive and preconscious.
A second claim is that mirror neurons provide a biological foundation
of empathy (Bernhardt and Singer 2012; Gallese 2001, 2003, 2009, 2014;
Iacoboni 2011; Keysers et al. 2010). This claim is drawn partly from fmri^
experiments that have reported mirroring in response to facial expressions
and other communicative actions, and in response to seeing evidence of
others’ bodily sensations (Keysers et al. 2010). For example, a series of pain
experiments reported activation in the somatosensory cortices when re-
search subjects were exposed to cues signaling that someone else is in pain,
seeing the facial expressions of others indicating pain, and observing pain
inflicted on the hands and feet of others (Singer et al. 2006). Another study
found neural activation in response to seeing another person’s tactile ex-
perience, including being touched or stroked on the leg, hand, and face
(Blakemore et al. 2005). Researchers argue that this activation, like premo-
tor mirroring, amounts to the creation of a vicarious bodily state. “With
this mechanism we do not just ‘see’ or ‘hear’ an action or an emotion. Side
by side with the sensory description of the observed social stimuli, inter-
nal representations of the state associated with these actions or emotions
are evoked in the observer, ‘as if ’ they were performing a similar action
or experiencing a similar emotion” (Gallese et al. 2004, 400). Such neural