I FEEL YOUR PAIN 87brains of people diagnosed on the autism spectrum (Gallese et al. 2009;
Gallese et al. 2013; Iacoboni 2008; Vivanti and Rogers 2014; Williams et al.
2001, 2006). Based on the idea that theory of mind is simulational rather
than propositional, they argue that social deficits symptomatic of autism
are due to deficits in motor cognition, rather than an inability to theorize
the perspective of another. This “broken mirror” theory of autism is con-
troversial since autism seems to have a complex etiology and manifests in a
wide variety of traits, and since mirror neurons are still poorly understood
(Enticott et al. 2013; Hamilton et al. 2007; Leighton et al. 2008; Pineda 2008;
Southgate and Hamilton 2008). The hypothesis also competes with other
theories of autism. For example, two other neuroscientific research pro-
grams I describe in this book — on the sexed brain and on oxytocin and
social bonds — have also proposed to be relevant to autism. My concern
here is that there is little consideration of simulation failures outside of
pathology. The hypothesis also problematically assumes that there are (as
yet unspecified) mirroring processes that can be said to be neurotypical.
The dynamism of embodied simulation theory, to borrow Papoulias and
Callard’s phrasing, is potentially “arrested at one end by evolution” (2010,
47) and at the other by a readily normative and singular model of mir-
roring. The model does not exclude possible roles for learning and social
context, but it fails to attend to how learning and context influence what
are thought to be automatic neural processes. By design, the model also
fails to acknowledge, outside of pathology, diversity in brains, persons, and
situations that could lead to epistemic differences and intersubjective and
intercorporeal conflict. It is not enough to propose that mirror neurons are
plastic and situated; also required is a consideration of how this plasticity
disrupts the homogeneity of embodiment across persons. In other words, it
has to address what difference context and experience make for the bodies
that are engaged in social interactions, and what differences the interac-
tions themselves create.
Situated Neurons and Embodied Perception
Critics of embodied simulation theory reject the idea that mirroring can
account for the complexity of either theory of mind or empathy. For ex-
ample, each of these may require not merely simulating what another per-