History of War – October 2019

(Elliott) #1
Why,then,didthePoleslose?Theeasy
answerandtheanswerthatGermanwartime
propagandawouldhaveusbelievewas–
Blitzkrieg.ThePoleswereovercomebya
superiorforcewithsuperiortactics,superior
technologyanda superiormilitarydoctrine.
Thereis somethingin that,certainly.It had
beena veryunequalfight.Notonlyhad
Germanyenjoyeda numericaladvantage
overthePoles,butitsmilitaryhardwareand
militarydoctrinesometimesappearedto
belongto anotherageof warfare.Though
thePolesfoughtwell,destroyingasmany
as1,000Germantanksandarmoured
vehicles,andaround 600 aircraft,theywere
outgunnedandoutfoughtin everytheatre.
AndwhenStalin’sRedArmyenteredthe
fray– itselfthelargestmilitaryforcein the
worldatthattime– theywerealreadyreeling.
FacedwithbothGermanandSovietforces,
theyhadlittleto nochance.
Thesefactsareincontrovertible,butto
attributethedefeatsolelyto thedeployment
of Blitzkriegis to flatterGermanforces.Forall
theundeniablesuperioritythattheWehrmacht
enjoyed,andthemagnitudeof itsvictory,

attributingPoland’sdefeatto a militaryidea
thatwasonlyimperfectlyappliedin 1939,is
a grosssimplification.Therewasclearlymore
to thestorythanthat.
ForonethingPolandwasgeographically
doomed.Notonlywasit flankedonthree
sidesbyGermanyanditsallySlovakia,with
theequallyhostileSovietUnionto theeast,
it alsoconsistedpredominantlyof flatterrain
largelylackingin naturalobstacles– the
greatNorthEuropeanPlain– whichis perfect
fortheeffectiveuseof tanksandmotorised
infantry.EvenwhenthePoleswereableto
defendpreparedpositions,therefore– such
asat Mławaor WegierskaGórka– theywere
forcedto withdrawowingto theriskof being
outflankedandsurrounded.
In additiontheweatherplayeditscapricious
part.Thesummerof 1939wasoneof the
driestonrecordin centralEurope,and
rainfallin PolandthatAugustwasbarely
two-thirdsof whatit hadbeenin previous
years.Consequently,theriversystemsthat
mightfeasiblyhavebeenexploitedto forman
additionallineof defence– mostnotablythe
Narewin thenorthandtheWartain thewest

lackedthevolumeof waterto makethata
ableproposition.
Therewerealsofailingsof thePoles’
ownmaking.Foronething,thePolishHigh
Command’sobsessionwithmilitarysecrecy
meantthatPolishunitshadnodirectcontact
withtroopsontheirflanks,werenotpermitted
to knowthewiderstrategicplan,andwere
unableto coordinatetheirmovements
effectively.WhiletheGermansweremoving
fasterandhittingharder,thePoleswere
effectivelyblindanddeaf.
Mostseriously,Poland’scomparative
economicweaknessin theinter-waryears
meantthat,forallitssize,thePolisharmy
wasill preparedto facetheGermansin 1939.
Theprimaryproblembeingthelackof armour.
Polishsoldierscouldmusterallthemartial
dashpossible,buttheycouldnotadequately
stemtheWehrmacht’sarmouredadvance
withoutsufficientarmourof theirown.
Polandhada feasiblestrategicplanandits
forcesgenerallyacquittedthemselveswell,yet
it wasultimatelyundonebytheperfidyof its
totalitarianneighbours,andthebetrayalof its
allies,whodidnothingto help,yetneglectedto
informWarsawof theirinaction.
Poland’sdefeatin 1939wasthechildof many
fathers,therefore,whichmakesit allthemore
peculiarthatthesimplisticmythologyof anall-
conqueringBlitzkrieghaspersistedforsolong.

Victimsof theCiepielowmassacre,
where 300 Polishprisonersof war
wereexecutedbytheWehrmacht

German troops escorting Polish
prisoners of war, near Lviv

Danzig – the city where the Second
World War begun

Images: Alamy, Mary Evans, Getty

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ANNIVERSARY
“TOATTRIBUTETHEDEFEATSOLELYTOTHEDEPLOYMENTOF
BLITZKRIEGIS TOFLATTER GERMANFORCES”



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O THE DEPLOYMENT OF


Roger Moorhouse’s latest book First
To Fight is out in September 2019,
published by Penguin Books

DEFENDING AGAINST THE BLITZKRIEG

Free download pdf