History of War – October 2019

Why,then,didthePoleslose?Theeasy

answerandtheanswerthatGermanwartime

propagandawouldhaveusbelievewas–

Blitzkrieg.ThePoleswereovercomebya

superiorforcewithsuperiortactics,superior

technologyanda superiormilitarydoctrine.

Thereis somethingin that,certainly.It had

beena veryunequalfight.Notonlyhad

Germanyenjoyeda numericaladvantage

overthePoles,butitsmilitaryhardwareand

militarydoctrinesometimesappearedto

belongto anotherageof warfare.Though

thePolesfoughtwell,destroyingasmany

as1,000Germantanksandarmoured

vehicles,andaround 600 aircraft,theywere

outgunnedandoutfoughtin everytheatre.

AndwhenStalin’sRedArmyenteredthe

fray– itselfthelargestmilitaryforcein the

worldatthattime– theywerealreadyreeling.

FacedwithbothGermanandSovietforces,

theyhadlittleto nochance.

Thesefactsareincontrovertible,butto

attributethedefeatsolelyto thedeployment

of Blitzkriegis to flatterGermanforces.Forall

theundeniablesuperioritythattheWehrmacht

enjoyed,andthemagnitudeof itsvictory,

attributingPoland’sdefeatto a militaryidea

thatwasonlyimperfectlyappliedin 1939,is

a grosssimplification.Therewasclearlymore

to thestorythanthat.

ForonethingPolandwasgeographically

doomed.Notonlywasit flankedonthree

sidesbyGermanyanditsallySlovakia,with

theequallyhostileSovietUnionto theeast,

it alsoconsistedpredominantlyof flatterrain

largelylackingin naturalobstacles– the

greatNorthEuropeanPlain– whichis perfect

fortheeffectiveuseof tanksandmotorised

infantry.EvenwhenthePoleswereableto

defendpreparedpositions,therefore– such

asat Mławaor WegierskaGórka– theywere

forcedto withdrawowingto theriskof being

outflankedandsurrounded.

In additiontheweatherplayeditscapricious

part.Thesummerof 1939wasoneof the

driestonrecordin centralEurope,and

rainfallin PolandthatAugustwasbarely

two-thirdsof whatit hadbeenin previous

years.Consequently,theriversystemsthat

mightfeasiblyhavebeenexploitedto forman

additionallineof defence– mostnotablythe

Narewin thenorthandtheWartain thewest

lackedthevolumeof waterto makethata

ableproposition.

Therewerealsofailingsof thePoles’

ownmaking.Foronething,thePolishHigh

Command’sobsessionwithmilitarysecrecy

meantthatPolishunitshadnodirectcontact

withtroopsontheirflanks,werenotpermitted

to knowthewiderstrategicplan,andwere

unableto coordinatetheirmovements

effectively.WhiletheGermansweremoving

fasterandhittingharder,thePoleswere

effectivelyblindanddeaf.

Mostseriously,Poland’scomparative

economicweaknessin theinter-waryears

meantthat,forallitssize,thePolisharmy

wasill preparedto facetheGermansin 1939.

Theprimaryproblembeingthelackof armour.

Polishsoldierscouldmusterallthemartial

dashpossible,buttheycouldnotadequately

stemtheWehrmacht’sarmouredadvance

withoutsufficientarmourof theirown.

Polandhada feasiblestrategicplanandits

forcesgenerallyacquittedthemselveswell,yet

it wasultimatelyundonebytheperfidyof its

totalitarianneighbours,andthebetrayalof its

allies,whodidnothingto help,yetneglectedto

informWarsawof theirinaction.

Poland’sdefeatin 1939wasthechildof many

fathers,therefore,whichmakesit allthemore

peculiarthatthesimplisticmythologyof anall-

conqueringBlitzkrieghaspersistedforsolong.

Victimsof theCiepielowmassacre,

where 300 Polishprisonersof war

wereexecutedbytheWehrmacht

German troops escorting Polish

prisoners of war, near Lviv

Danzig – the city where the Second

World War begun

Images: Alamy, Mary Evans, Getty

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ANNIVERSARY
“TOATTRIBUTETHEDEFEATSOLELYTOTHEDEPLOYMENTOF
BLITZKRIEGIS TOFLATTER GERMANFORCES”

–

vi

p

O THE DEPLOYMENT OF

Roger Moorhouse’s latest book First

To Fight is out in September 2019,

published by Penguin Books

DEFENDING AGAINST THE BLITZKRIEG