History of War – October 2019

TheattackalertedBrigadierOliverJackson

to thebase’svulnerabilityto VietCongattacks

andA, B andC Companiesof 6 RARwere

sentoutthefollowingmorningto locatethe

enemy’sfiringpositions.B Companypatrolled

eastanddiscoveredmortarbasesandrocket

positionstowardsLongTan.Theyremainedin

thefieldovernightbeforeD Companyrelieved

them,“WehadbeenlookingaftertheAPC

areabutwewentoutnextmorningto take

overbecauseB Companyhadgoneoutwithout

equipmentandrations.”

Smithwasin commandof 108menthat

included 105 soldiersof D Company.These

weresplitinto10, 11 and 12 Platoonsplus

a companyheadquarterssupportsection.

Therewerealsothreeforwardobservation

artillerymenfrom 161 Battery,RoyalNew

ZealandArtillery.Thesoldiersof D Company

believedtheVietConghadsincedepartedand

weresmallin number,“Weestimatedthatthere

wereonly40-50of themandthatthey’dlong

gonebackto theirhomebasein thejungleto

theeastof LongTan.Therewasnowayin the

worldthatweexpectedanyoneto bethere.”

LongTanwasanabandonedvillagethat

wasdominatedbya rubberplantationsome

fourkilometreseastof NuiDat.Afterrelieving

B Companyandsharinglunchwiththem,D

Companytookoverpatrollingduties.Smith

decidedto pushfurtherforward,“Ataround

2.30-3.00pmI decidedto headeastbecause

I reckonedthatif theenemywasgoingto go

anywheretheywouldhavegoneintothejungle

to theeastof theplantation.I alsodidn’t

wantto bethereovernight,it wasbadfor

mosquitoesandit wasmuchbetterto bein

thejungleforsecurity.”

Therewasinitiallynosignof enemy

activitybutSmithspreadhisplatoons

outto widenthesearch,“BCompany

hadgonehalfwaythroughtheplantation

thatmorningandsawnothing.However,I

spreadmycompanyoutjustin caseto ten

metresbetweenmensowewerecovering

twosectionsupin eachplatoon.Wewere

covering 400 metresacrossandin depth

andweslowlymovedeastin thatformation.”

It was 11 Platoonwhofirstencounteredthe

enemy,“We’dgone200-300metresupan

oxcartroadwhenupfromthesouthcamesix

to eightVietCongchattingawaynonchalantly.

Theyweren’tawareof usandweweren’taware

of themuntiltheywererightonus.My 11

Platoonsergeant,BobBuick,openedfireand

knockedoneVietCongover.Hismatesdragged

himawayandheleftbehindanAK-47assault

rifle,whichplatooncommanderGordonSharp

pickedup, 11 Platoonquicklyfollowedupand

chasedtheenemyto theeast.”

SmithheldD Companybackto assessthe

situation,“Wegota fewmortarroundsfiredfrom

somewheredownsouththatlandednearus.I

movedthecompanyabout 300 metresto the

northeastanddecidedthat’swhereI wouldhave

a defensivepositionif anythinghappened.”

At thispoint 11 Platoonwasfullyattacked,“I

wouldn’tsaytheywereambushedbuttheywere

attackedbytheNorthVietnamesewhoobviously

movedforwardintotherubberwhentheyheard

thesoundsof thecontact.I pulledthembackto

joinusandweformeda companyposition.”

Thisassault,whichlastedabouttenminutes,

ledto thebattlebeginningin earnest,“There

wassomuchsmokefromtheartilleryshellsthat

youcouldn’tseea lotbuttheyfinallylocated

wherewewere.Theystartedto putin whatI

believewasbattalion-sizedattacksonus.”

Monsoonsandbombardments

D Companywerenowfacedwitha largeenemy

forceof VietCongandNorthVietnamesetroops

primarilyfrom275thRegimentbutalsofrom

5thDivisionandD445ProvincialBattalion.

Tothisday,Smithdoesnotknowhowmany

opposingsoldiershefought,“Thereareall

sortsof figures.Theenemyhistoryhasbeen

rewrittenmanytimesandtheirimpressionis

theyhadthreebattalionseachof about 600

men.Thatwouldmeanwewerepotentially

fighting1,800enemysoldiers.Wewere

significantlyoutnumberedbutthenagainthey

weren’tallupfrontin theline.”

Smithwaswiththecompanyheadquarters

thatconsistedof thecompanysergeantmajor

(CSM),a batman,twosignallersandthree

machine-guncrews.Hisplatoonswerefurther

spreadoutandtheterrainmadevisibility

difficult,“Theplantationhadtreesthatwerelaid

outin rowsbuttherewasa lotof ‘dirtygrowth’

thathadbeenuntendedsincethetaskforce

arrived.A lotof weedshadgrownupbetween

thetreesandalthoughit wasn’timpassableit

madeit difficultto seedownthelanes.”

Thevisibilitywasalsocompoundedby the

onsetof a monsoon,“Itstartedto rainat

about4.30pm.It rainedprettymuchevery

afternoonbutonthisparticulardaytherewere

thunderstormsandlightningandit reallypoured.

It camedownlikenootherrainthatI’deverseen

in Malayaor in Vietnambeforeandafter.The

groundwasjustafloatwithwaterandtherewas

nopointin tryingto digtrenchesbecausethey

justfilledup.Wehadto layontheground.”

TheprecipitationwassobadthatSmith

struggledto evenreadhischarts,“[Captain]

MorrieStanleywasmyartilleryadvisorandhe

andI werelyingsidebysidetryingto keepour

mapscleanof mud.Thiswassowecouldsee

exactlywherethesoldierswereandwherewe

weregoingto putthenextbatteryof fire.”

Throughoutthebattle,artillerysupport

fromAustralianandNewZealandbatteries

backatNuiDat(withadditionalAmerican

support)wasessential,“Weweresaved

bytheartillerywhofired3,500rounds.

That’sa lotof highexplosivesandI think

if wehadnothadtheartilleryI wouldnot

betalkingto younow.Wehad 24 guns

firing,includingsixAmerican155mmself-

propelledgunswith90-poundshells.”

Keyto thisbombardmentwastheradio

communicationbetweenSmith,theartilleryand

SmithbriefedtheworldpressaboutLong

Tanin Saigonshortlyafterthebattle

Second Lieutenant Dave Sabben, commander

of 12 Platoon, guards a captured Viet Cong

gun the morning after the battle

“MY MAIN AIM WAS TO KILL

THE ENEMY, WHICH IS THE

ROLE OF THE INFANTRY, AND I

HAD TO GET MY SOLDIERS IN

THE BEST SITUATION WHERE

THEY COULD DO THAT”

ANZACS AT LONG TAN