Financial Times Europe - 19.08.2019

(Joyce) #1
Monday 19 August 2019 ★ FINANCIAL TIMES 19

Opinion


T


he coming week marks the
15th anniversary of Google’s
initial public offering — the
first concerted effort to
break the hammerlock that
investment banks have always held on
stock offerings. That attempt failed. But
now, due to mounting frustrations,
advances in technology and changes in
the capital markets, investment banks
are about permanently to lose the gate-
keeping position they have jealously
protected.
Google’s IPO was the first time a large
technology company had expressed
public frustration at the way investment
banks cloaked IPOs in secrecy, making
it impossible for either issuer or buyer
to figure out what was happening
behind the curtain. Instead, Google’s
management asked the banks to run an
open auction — much as eBay conducts

ing which management teams rush
through 30-minute slide-decks in front
of investors, look antiquated compared
with comprehensive business reviews
or lengthy YouTube videos — duly vet-
ted by the US Securities and Exchange
Commission and available for all.
Some banks are mounting a rear-
guard action. They claim that only size-
able or well-known consumer compa-
nies have the heft and following to stage
a direct listing. They cling to the vain
hope that less high-profile businesses
will be unable to manage for themselves
or that managements without a lot of
cash on their balance sheets will lose
their nerve. This is despite the fact that
hundreds of companies operating in
obscure niches are publicly traded.
During the next couple of years, com-
panies already well advanced with plans
to go public will probably use the con-
ventional approach. But, for all others,
the choice of a direct listing or a tradi-
tional IPO has become a test of two
attributes: courage and intelligence.

The writer is a partner at Sequoia Capital.
These views are his own

company wants; gruelling two and
three-week roadshows; and — the final
indignity — selection of who is permit-
ted to price and buy the shares.
Buyers have been just as frustrated.
Genuine long-term shareholders want-
ing to buy large amounts of a company’s
stock have been stymied because the
banks allocated shares to their favoured
clients the way fishermen chum the
waters. The result: these buyers usually
flip their initial shares for a short-term
profit and wait for a market pullback to
build the position they want.
The world has changed. There has
been a blurring between the public and
the private markets. Young companies
are staying private far longer than their
predecessors: by now, many of the man-
agements have ample experience rais-
ing large amounts of money without any
intermediaries. Similarly, the usual cus-
tomers for IPOs — mutual funds and
hedge funds — are seeking out inde-
pendently the most promising private
companies, and alternate market mak-
ers are raising their hands.
Technology also favours the direct
listing. The traditional roadshow, dur-

rthy, chief financial officer at Spotify
(and previously CFO at Netflix), to buck
the system, shining a light on the tactics
that the banks have used to frustrate
and exasperate everyone but them-
selves. Bill Hambrecht, a San Francisco
investment banker who helped take
Apple public in 1980, spent much of the
1990s making similar arguments to Mr

McCarthy — but he failed because his
former competitors and collaborators
made him a pariah in the manner that
the mob treats a turncoat.
Mr McCarthy’s complaints against
traditional IPOs included an inflexible
commission structure; a tendency to
dictate how much money a company
should raise; an arcane instrument
known as the “greenshoe”, which allows
the banks to raise more money than the

a sale — to determine an eventual price.
No other company followed suit, largely
because the banks closed ranks and suc-
ceeded, in a disinformation campaign
worthy of the NRA gun lobby in the US,
in portraying the IPO as a flop.
Now, years later, the groundswell of
dissatisfaction is about to erupt into
action. This new approach, dubbed a
direct listing, has so far been employed
by only three companies: the music
streaming service Spotify and p ayments
company Adyen (both of which started
outside the US), and Slack, a San Fran-
cisco software company.
These direct listings, largely control-
led by the company that is selling
shares, occurred because the shrewd
and the brave caught on to the idea that,
for stock offerings, investment banks
occupy the same position in the invest-
ment universe as a scalper does in the
theatre world. No actor, theatre owner,
producer or audience member enjoys
knowing that a ticket tout has run off
with money that should belong to them.
The same goes for the people involved
with private companies.
It took the backbone of Barry McCa-

Investment banks lose their stranglehold on IPOs


Companies’ dissatisfaction
is about to erupt into action

with a new approach


dubbed the direct listing


B


rexit has turned into a hos-
tage situation. Boris Johnson
is the kidnapper, Ireland is
the captive and the backstop
is the ransom. The British
message to the EU is, “Drop the back-
stop or we’ll kill the hostage in a no-deal
shootout”. Doubtless the UK could
inflict much harm on Ireland, particu-
larly in agriculture: near 70 per cent of
UK beef imports come from Ireland, for
example. And crashing out could badly
interrupt Ireland’s global supply chain.
Nearly half of the 475,000 Irish freight
containers of cargo per year going
through British ports go to the EU.
That said, the Irish economy is much
less dependent on the UK than many
Brexiters imagine. Tactically, Dublin
knows that “no deal” is only “no deal”
for now. The UK must eventually do a
trade deal with the EU because 46 per
cent of UK exports go to the EU and 53

per cent of UK imports come from the
EU. No matter how the hostage drama
turns out, and no matter what the politi-
cal and economic fallout, the UK will be
back at the table soon. The more chaos
at British ports, the shorter the self-im-
posed mercantile lockout.
In the meantime, London’s new Brexit
strategy is to inflict as much commercial
damage on Ireland as possible. Given
that Ireland didn’t ask for, or vote in, the
Brexit referendum and, in recent dec-
ades, has been an impeccable neighbour
and a calm, dependable partner in the
British-created tinderbox that is North-
ern Ireland, this new aggression seems
unjustified. However British sensitivity
towards Irish concerns has never fig-
ured highly in Anglo-Irish affairs.
Part of the new British approach has
been a relentless campaign to paint
itself as the victim of Irish inflexibility,
simultaneously emboldened by a Rule
Britannia assurance that Ireland can,
and will, be brought to heel. This unsta-
ble combination of whingeing victim-
hood twinned with pompous self-regard
has characterised much of Britain’s
negotiations thus far. What has been
absent are economic facts.

Here they are. In 1953, when Winston
Churchill was prime minister for the last
time, 91 per cent of Irish exports went to
the UK. Today, that figure is 11 per cent
and falling. Far from being the poor,
dependent outpost relying on British
largesse — as depicted by Brexiters —
the Republic of Ireland is an outward-
looking, dynamic, trading entrepot.
Today, Irish firms in the UK employ
more people than UK firms in Ireland.

Small countries must overcome the
tyranny of geography. They live and die
by the quality of their strategic thinking.
Part of the Irish strategy in joining the
European Economic Community was to
break its dependency on the UK, seek-
ing new markets in richer, continental
Europe. And Ireland has been far more
successful in diversifying from the UK
than the UK has been in diversifying

from Ireland. Today, little Ireland
remains the UK’s fifth largest export
market. Furthermore, the UK runs a
large trade surplus with Ireland — in
fact, its second-largest trade surplus
after the US. Strangling Ireland would
hurt UK business much more than the
other way around.
Ireland buys more from Britain
because Ireland is much richer. Rich
people buy stuff. On a conservative esti-
mate, the Irish are now over 25 per cent
richer than their UK counterparts. Irish
income per capita rose from €13,934 in
1995 to €40,655 in 2018 — growth of 192
per cent. In contrast, UK income per
capita rose from £21,716 in 1995 to
£30,594 in 2018 — growth of roughly 41
per cent. Ireland is growing nearly five
times faster than the UK every year.
Ireland is also a far more globalised
economy. When Britain pulled out of
Ireland, it took its capital too. It’s taken
us a while to catch up, but eventually we
deployed fresh American capital by
using our tax system, transforming the
economy. This export-orientation
ensured that Ireland is today a formida-
ble trading machine. Based on the most
recent data, the value of all goods and

services exports per employed person in
Ireland was €126,630 per year, com-
pared to just €17,627 in the UK. Total
trade in Ireland was 178 per cent of Ire-
land’s gross domestic product, which
was significantly higher than the EU
overall (77 per cent) and the UK (54 per
cent). If there is a Singapore of Europe, it
wears green not red, white and blue.
As Ireland and the UK are in competi-
tion with each other for mobile capital
and talent, arguably Brexit will be posi-
tive for Ireland. Which looks more
attractive, the country that is open to
everyone, with fully free access to the
EU and no barriers to work, or the coun-
try that needlessly erects tariffs and
borders against the trading bloc with
which it does half of its trade?
Ireland can’t stop the UK if it intends
to go down this route, but the EU single
market and customs union are far more
important for us. We understand the
yearning for sovereignty, identity and
independence, believe me. But just one
piece of advice: the first 70 years are the
hardest, after that it gets easier.

The writer is an economist, author and
broadcaster

Whingeing victimhood
and pompous self-regard

have characterised the UK’s


negotiations thus far


Punishing Ireland’s economy will backfire on Brexiters


David
McWilliams

L


ater this month, the G7 heads
of state and government meet
in Biarritz in France to dis-
cuss the fight against global
inequality.
This is no routine summit. Only a
small and committed core of nations is
capable of addressing the forces threat-
ening the world order. Prosperity has
increased dramatically in recent dec-
ades, but not for all, while global institu-
tions leave much to be desired.
The UN General Assembly, with its
193 members, has slowly sunk into irrel-
evance, while the G20, the G7’s larger
cousin, has not delivered real change.
Indeed, how could a body that includes
authoritarian strongman leaders such
as Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey,
Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Jair Bolsonaro
of Brazil, China’s Xi Jinping and Moham-
med bin Salman of Saudi Arabia (which
will host next year’s summit) possibly
do so?
This is a time for hard decisions, not
wishful thinking. And realistically, the
G7 is the only forum in which to take
them. All its members are solid democ-
racies with comparable levels of educa-
tion and prosperity. The governments
of the seven may strongly disagree on a
number of issues, but all were fairly
elected in countries with constitutional
checks and balances.
Inequalities, real or perceived, have
brought most developed countries to
the boil in recent years. For the past nine
months, for example, France has been
the setting for the angry, often violent
gilets jaunesrevolt by citizens who feel
that they have been left behind. Voices

from the extremes are growing louder in
the other countries of the G7 too, even in
traditionally peaceable Japan. Business
as usual, therefore, is not an option.
“I’m a capitalist, and even I think cap-
italism is broken”, Ray Dalio, chief exec-
utive of Bridgewater Associates said
recently. And he is not alone among
those who used to be called “masters of
the universe”. Larry Fink, the legendary
chairman and chief executive of Black-
Rock, the asset manager with some
$6.5tn under management, believes
sustainable companies will outperform
the rest in the long run: “They will
attract better people — and savvier cus-
tomers — because they are better capi-
talists, committed to a fairer society.”
This is an opportunity for the G7. It
can, and should, lead by example. In
July in Aix-en-Provence, Medef, the
French employers’ federation, hosted
the B7 — business leaders from the G
countries. Geoffroy Roux de Bézieux,
the chairman of Medef, chose to involve,
for the first time, the G7 labour organi-
sations — the L7.
Together, the two groups signed a dec-
laration on social cohesion and the fight
against inequality. “We believe that the
global economy cannot be inclusive and
sustainable if it excludes a large part of
the population from... the benefits of
growth,” the declaration reads. This is
essential, it goes on, if we are to “restore
confidence in order to prevent the risk
of a growing share of the population
feeling vulnerable and losing faith in
democracy and the global economy”.
This new awareness is cause for cau-
tious optimism. In 1944, the future win-
ners of the second world war gathered at
Bretton Woods to plan a global financial
governance system that would prevent
a recurrence of the crises of the 1920s
and 1930s, promising stability after six
years of bloody conflict. But no mention
was made then, and barely a thought
given, to the social and employment
dimension. The assumption was that
prosperity for some would, eventually,
mean at least modest prosperity for all.
The B7/L7 declaration goes much fur-
ther. For the first time, it suggests co-or-
dinated action with no stakeholder left
behind. The interests of management
and workers are, in the long run, the
same.
Together, business leaders and labour
organisations are daring the G7 leaders
who will gather in Biarritz on Saturday
to flex their collective muscle.

The writer is president for European and
international affairs at Medef, the French
employers’ federation

The interests


of workers


and managers


are aligned


Bernard
Spitz

Inequalities, real or
perceived, have brought

most developed countries


to the boil in recent years


downturn. There will probably be more
attempts by Mr Trump to wrongfoot the
opposition, such as the decision to delay
new tariffs on Chinese goods until
December so that consumers won’t be
hurt during the Christmas shopping sea-
son. (None of this makes a real trade
deal more likely.)
Meanwhile, American consumers are
already hurting and that could have big
implications for Mr Trump’s 2020 re-
election campaign. Momentum in job
growth in swing states such as Michigan,
Ohio and Pennsylvania is slowing.
One recent report conducted by lib-
eral pollster Stan Greenberg showed
that a third of working-class white
women in some conservative areas are
starting to turn against the president,
irritated by his frequent boasts about
the booming US economy. “Maybe in
New York City,” said one woman from
Wisconsin. “But not here.”
For Mr Trump, and the US public at
large, the summer of fear may turn into
a winter of political discontent.

[email protected]

historic predictor of trouble in bigger
companies. At the end of a recovery
cycle, capital tends to crowd into large
companies and smaller firms suffer.
As the markets finally come to terms
with increased political risk, currency
risk, credit risk, and the growing likeli-
hood of leftwing governments, it’s clear
that the shifts and the shocks are com-
ing fast and furious. No wonder that eve-
ryone is now left asking, “What comes
next?”
The answer, I believe, is very likely to
be a synchronised global recession,
punctuated by a step-by-step market
downturn — one in which there may be
the odd rally, but the general direction is
down. This could last for some years. In
the next few weeks, I would expect new
lows in bond yields, a deepening of the
yield curve inversion, higher prices for
“safety” assets like the yen and swiss
franc, and a continued bull market in
gold.
I would also expect more tough talk
from Donald Trump. The US president’s
persistent bashing of China and the Fed-
eral Reserve will follow any market

biggest economic shift of our lifetimes.
Why is this new reality taking so long
to sink in? Because we have spent dec-
ades of living in the old reality — the
post-Bretton Woods, neoliberal one.
Unfettered economic globalisation and
years of easy monetary policy have
buoyed asset prices and favoured capi-
tal over labour, seemingly indefinitely.
Our senses have been numbed by tril-
lions of dollars released by central
banks, by algorithmic trading programs
that buy on the dip and thus diminish
the sense of long-term political risk, and
by record passive investing.
All this has combined to dampen the
signals that are now, finally, blinking
red. Witness the recent downturn in
bank, transport, and industrial indices,
as well as the fall in small-cap stocks, a

As strategist Louis-Vincent Gave of
Gavekal pointed out in an investor note,
the “fingerprints of many culprits can
be detected” in the manufacturing sec-
tor’s troubles, from an automobile sec-
tor facing structural challenges, to the
Boeing 737 Max fiasco and its effect on
global supply chains, to the lack of any
big new product launches in the tech-
nology sector, to lacklustre corporate
investment, a weak energy sector and a
slowdown in China. All that is required
is one big sovereign default or a cascade
of corporate bankruptcies and we could
see the market in free fall.
Politics, of course, hasn’t helped. But
again, none of the recent developments
have been very surprising. Take Argen-
tina, which suffered a 48 per cent one-
day market drop last week after its pres-
idential primary election saw the Per-
onist opposition comfortably ahead.
The question is why investors were, as
the oldCasablancaline goes, “shocked,
shocked!” to find that a country that has
been a serial defaulter would swing back
to the left.
This raises other questions. What
might happen in the UK if a general elec-
tion, before or after a no-deal Brexit,
allows Jeremy Corbyn to take power?
What might the future of Italy’s turbu-
lent politics hold? What could be the
impact of an Elizabeth Warren or Bernie
Sanders victory in the US primaries? As
a r e c e n t 1 3 D G l o b a l S t r a t e g y
and Research note put it, such events
would “fit perfectly into the cycle
from wealth accumulation to wealth
distribution”, which I believe will be the

P


aradigm shifts tend to hap-
pen slowly, and then all at
once. That’s the lesson I’ve
taken away from the recent
market turmoil. As I wrote
last week, the surprise is only that the
upset didn’t come sooner.
Pundits may have pegged the worst
Dow drop of the year to fresh bond yield
curve inversions in the US (a historic
predictor of downturns) but the under-
lying signs of sickness in the global econ-
omy have been with us for a long time.
The question was when the markets
were going to put aside the complacency
bred by a decade of low interest rates
and central bank money dumps, in the
form of quantitative easing, and
embrace this new reality.
Consider that since January 2018
every major economy except India’s has
seen a deterioration in its purchasing
managers’ indices. PMIs are one of the
best forward-looking indicators of eco-
nomic conditions for the manufacturing
sector, which is a bellwether for overall
economic activity. The slowdown in the
eurozone has been dramatic — particu-
larly in places such as Italy and Ger-
many, where the economy is now offi-
cially shrinking.

Markets are


adjusting to a


turbulent world


After decades of living in
the old, neoliberal reality,

the shifts and shocks are


coming fast and furious


Michael
Moritz

ECONOMICS


Rana


Foroohar


AUGUST 19 2019 Section:Features Time: 18/8/2019 - 17: 58 User: nicola.davison Page Name: COMMENT USA, Part,Page,Edition: USA, 19, 1


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