The Wall Street Journal - 17.08.2019 - 18.08.2019

(Sean Pound) #1

C2| Saturday/Sunday, August 17 - 18, 2019 ** THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.**


With the development of
modern firearms, ballistic sci-
ence came to be applied to the
trajectories of bullets shot from
guns, and also large-caliber
shells fired by artillery and war-
ships. Protection from such pro-
jectiles also got the “ballistic” la-
bel. An 1896 article in Scientific
American about testing defenses
of an American battleship de-
scribed how the “ballistic armor
plate” of the ship’s turret was
damaged by armor-piercing
shells.
Ballistics really took off with
the creation of rocket-propelled
missiles after World War II. An
Associated Press article in 1950
forecasting military develop-
ments over the second half of
the 20th century predicted that
“there likely will be interconti-
nental ballistic missiles, capable
of being shot out of the atmo-
sphere and descending meteor-
like on a target.” That prediction
quickly proved true: In the arms
race against the Soviet Union,
the U.S. military began referring
to intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles with nuclear warheads us-
ing the shorthand “IBM” in 1954,
and the now-common “ICBM”
the year after that. (“Ballistic
missiles” launched high into the

atmosphere were distinguished
from guided “cruise missiles”
flying low to the surface of the
Earth.)
In the mid-1980s, “ballistic”
took on a more metaphorical
meaning having to do with blow-
ing up in an emotional way. In
1984, the Los Angeles Times re-
ported about the reaction of U.S.
negotiator Philip Habib when he
learned of a secret agreement
between Israel and Lebanon:
“When Habib found out about it
he went ballistic.” The following
year, a Washington Post article
about Defense Department plans
to cut the budget for light-infan-
try divisions quoted a Pentagon
executive as saying that Army
Chief of Staff John A. Wickham
Jr. “went ballistic when he heard
about the recommendation.”
“Going ballistic” was likely in-
fluenced by other slang expres-
sions for losing one’s top, such
as “going ape” or “going ba-
nanas.” But an era of sophisti-
cated weaponry has spawned a
more technologically advanced
figure of speech for becoming ir-
rationally angry. We can only
hope that if cooler heads prevail
there will be fewer cases of go-
ing ballistic, either literally or
figuratively. KOREA NEWS SERVICE/ASSOCIATED PRESS

On the home front, tragically,
mass shootings have become so
common that according to the
Washington Post, “an industry of
ballistic goods for everyday
Americans” has emerged for
consumers seeking bulletproof
gear. “Ballistic backpacks”
equipped with bulletproof inserts
are an increasingly common
sight among back-to-school re-
tail offerings.
“Ballistic” describes the mo-
tion of any projectile, which
rises and falls in a parabola
from its initial launch on the
way to a target. The word has
followed its own peculiar trajec-
tory, going back to a Greek root,
“ballein,” meaning “to throw.” In
classical Latin, “ballista” literally
meant “a throwing machine,”
used for an ancient military en-
gine designed for hurling stones

and other
missiles in
siege warfare.
Prefixed with
a root mean-
ing “bow,” the
word became
“arcuballista” (or “arbalest,” as
it was known in medieval
French), referring to a crossbow
that could shoot arrow-like pro-
jectiles with precision.
Keeping track of the flight
paths of all of these objects
thrown or discharged from
weapons became the purview of
the field of mechanics known as
“ballistics.” Early English uses of
the term starting in the 17th
century come from translations
of the work of French mathema-
ticians (often writing in Latin)
observing the parabolic path-
ways of cannonballs and the like.

North Korea
distributed
this photo of
a missile
launch on
Aug. 10.

IN THE U.S. and abroad, the
word “ballistic” is getting more
use than usual. The Korean Pen-
insula has become “a ballistically
busy place,” reports Aviation
Week. North Korea fired two
projectiles believed to be short-
range ballistic missiles on Friday,

the sixth such test over a period
of three weeks. Meanwhile,
South Korea has been develop-
ing its own tactical ballistic mis-
siles that it says can outdo the
capabilities of its communist
neighbors to the north.

[Ballistic]


A Loaded


Term Has


A Rising


Trajectory


REVIEW


WORD ON
THE STREET


BEN
ZIMMER

international community or at least the majority of it
welcomes China’s leadership, and whether China’s po-
litical system can sustain world leadership.”
Throughout history, China’s relationship with the
world—when the country wasn’t enduring foreign in-
vasions itself—was often that of a central empire sur-
rounded by friendly vassal states, which lived by their
own rules as long as they paid tribute and complied
with China’s aims. In some ways, this seems to be
Beijing’s aspiration today, at least when it comes to
China’s own neighborhood.
“China is not seeking to change the way Australia
or Britain is governed. What it wants is [for] foreign
governments to pay respect and be supportive of
what it seeks. It wants to be able to achieve its goals
with the minimum of opposition,” said Malcolm Turn-
bull, who served until last year as Australia’s prime
minister. In that pursuit, China’s recent behavior—
particularly its aggressive military posture in the con-
tested South China Sea—has been counterproductive,
Mr. Turnbull added: “They’ve pushed their neighbors,
including Vietnam, closer and closer to the U.S. secu-
rity orbit.”
Indeed, hardly any neighbor of China—with the
notable exception of an increasingly friendly and de-
pendent Russia—has been spared its wrath in recent
years, and not just in the South China Sea. Land-
locked Mongolia saw vital border traffic stall after the
Dalai Lama visited the country in 2016 and had to
promise Beijing that the Tibetan spiritual leader
would never return. India and China came close to a
military clash at their disputed frontier in the Himala-
yas in 2017. That same year, Seoul’s decision to deploy
a U.S. antiballistic missile defense system prompted
a Chinese campaign against South Korean companies
and products. Australia’s coal shipments were sub-
jected to restrictions earlier this year after it banned
Huawei from its 5G network. And two Canadian citi-
zens have been jailed on national-security charges
since December after Canada detained Huawei’s CFO,
Meng Wanzhou, on a U.S. extradition request.
“Now that China is a major power with the sec-
ond-largest defense budget in the world, its words
and actions are seen differently,” Singapore’s prime
minister, Lee Hsien Loong, said in a recent speech.
“To grow its international influence beyond hard
power, China needs to wield this strength with re-
straint and legitimacy.”
Just how carefully Mr. Xi’s China wields this influ-
ence—and deals with Western attempts to offset it—
will be a crucial global issue for years to come. “The
hope is that China learns some of the lessons of impe-
rialism without having to go through the crises and
conflicts that imperialism traditionally provokes,”
said Rory Medcalf, head of the National Security Col-
lege at the Australian National University. “But that
will be a set of choices for China to make—and it will
depend on the quality of debate and decision-making
inside China.” FROM TOP: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES; REUTERS

Above, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping reviews
the troops, Beijing, Sept. 16, 1981. Left, Chinese
warships and fighter jets take part in a military
display in the South China Sea, April 12, 2018.

A Backlash Against


Xi’s New Course?


Meanwhile, in the developing world, controversies have grown around
Mr. Xi’s ambitious Belt and Road initiative, which is meant to seed bil-
lions of dollars in Chinese investment across the globe. From Malaysia
to the Maldives, politicians have won office partly by challenging the cor-
ruption and debt surrounding many Chinese projects.
“The transition from a low-profile international strategy to all-out as-
sertiveness and activism was premature, and China was not really pre-
pared to embark on such a dramatic transition,” said Li Mingjiang, coor-
dinator of the China program at the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies in Singapore.
The great question raised by China’s new posture is whether it can
navigate the shift in its relative power without spiraling into an outright
confrontation with the U.S. Such a clash could handicap the world’s two
largest economies—and, in the worst-case scenario now being openly
discussed by policy makers on both sides of the Pacific, even throw Asia
into a major war.
“The rise of China’s power is not just about glory, it is also destined
to be risky,” said Zhu Feng, director of the Institute
of International Studies at Nanjing University.
When Deng took over in 1978, China was emerg-
ing from the horrors of famine and the Cultural Rev-
olution; the country had been isolated for decades.
Jettisoning much of communist dogma, he urged the
Chinese to get rich and worked to integrate the
country into the global market. The economy soared,
and many Western leaders assumed that, over time,
China’s political system would open up too.
The 2008 financial crisis, which Beijing helped to
alleviate by pumping liquidity into Western markets,
shook such beliefs. The crisis convinced many in
China’s establishment that the Western system was
about to collapse—and that the time had come for
Beijing to emerge from the shadows and propose an
alternative.
“In 2008, socialism with Chinese characteristics
saved capitalism,” said Hu Angang, dean of the Insti-
tute for Contemporary China Studies at Tsinghua
University in Beijing and an influential voice in
China’s hawkish policy circles. “Before 2008, many
Chinese economists saw the U.S. as the best model
for macroeconomic regulation. But the financial cri-
sis broke their perceptions.”
In parallel with a popular crackdown on widespread corruption, Mr.
Xi has reasserted Communist Party control over China’s society and
economy, including private enterprises. He has eliminated term limits for
his own rule, accelerated China’s military buildup and authorized the dra-
conian repression of Muslims in the western Xinjiang region.
Criticism of Mr. Xi’s harder line is rare in China’s tightly con-
trolled press and censored social media. But many influential lib-
eral voices in the country’s foreign-policy establishment, as well
as among its business elites, continue to warn of the perils
ahead—and to call for a course correction.
“China should now use a new type of taking a low profile,
should use at least five-six years to make a sufficient strategic
retrenchment,” said Shi Yinhong, another adviser to the State
Council and a professor of international relations at Renmin Uni-
versity in Beijing. “China, together with its strong achievements,
jumped too fast and too quickly on the strategic front.” Deng
Xiaoping’s elderly son, Deng Pufang, made a similar point in a
November speech, warning that China “should keep a sober mind
and know our own place.”
How much Mr. Xi is listening to advice to slow down isn’t
clear. “Xi Jinping has a tight grip of control over the Chinese sys-
tem, but he has to be attentive,” said Ryan Hass, a fellow at the
Brookings Institution who worked on China policy at the National
Security Council from 2013-17. “There is definitely grumbling and
some discontent about the direction where China is headed at
the moment. I don’t think it has yet reached the point where it
will compel the leadership to adjust the direction where they are
headed, but it is not insignificant.”
The voices of doves in China’s policy community, state-run think tanks
and private businesses are at least partially offset by the cries of nation-
alist hawks. The latter group includes retired generals who have recently
urged Beijing to take an even more aggressive approach, including invad-
ing Taiwan and sinking U.S. aircraft carriers. In a June speech at a con-
ference attended by his U.S. counterpart, Chinese Defense Minister Wei
Fenghe vowed that Beijing wouldn’t succumb to American pressure. “The
more severe the pressure and difficulties are, the stronger and braver the
Chinese people become. Adversity only brings our nation greater solidar-
ity and strength,” Gen. Wei said. “As for what the general public of China
says these days: A talk? Welcome. A fight? Ready. Bully us? No way.”
As trade tensions with Washington intensified this summer, many edi-
torials in Beijing’s government publications zeroed in on so-called “capit-
ulators” who argue for a softer stance toward the U.S. and a less asser-


Continued from the prior page


tive foreign policy, accusing them of lacking faith in
China’s abilities and of betraying the country’s na-
tional interests. “Yes, the elites are being cautious—
but if you talk to people on the street, that’s very dif-
ferent,” a senior Chinese military official said. “They
want more.”
But China’s power has limits. The Chinese military,
while rapidly modernizing, lacks combat experience.
The new, more muscular posture adopted by China’s
diplomatic service has led to several blunders; recent
attempts by Chinese embassies from Moscow to
Rome to bully local media backfired badly. And de-
spite historic strides in development—including new
airports, railroads and highways that often put Amer-
ica’s decaying infrastructure to shame—China re-
mains a middle-income country, with a per capita
GDP roughly the same as Mexico’s.
Moreover, while China is a leader in some indus-
tries of the future, such as 5G and artificial intelli-
gence, the country remains dependent on technology
flows from the U.S. and other Western countries. Re-
cent measures taken by Washington and its allies
against two Chinese telecommunications firms, Hua-
wei Technologies Co. and ZTE Corp., have fostered
fears that the West seeks to choke off China’s path to
further technological advances.
“China needs reasonable space for its develop-
ment,” said Ni Jianjun of CICIR, a think tank affiliated
with China’s Ministry of State Security. “China ini-
tially hoped to find a comfortable spot in the existing
international system, but it is finding it to be more
and more difficult, with more and more resistance.”
Many countries are suspicious of China’s inten-
tions because Beijing has been deliberately vague
about how it sees its new role in the world. China
gives assurances about “win-win” cooperation and its
commitment to avoiding hegemony even as it increas-
ingly tries to intimidate smaller countries.
“China isn’t a world leader. China has never been
a world leader. It’s a totally new challenge for China,”
said Cheng Xiaohe, an associate professor of interna-
tional studies at Renmin University. “There is a num-
ber of things China needs to think about: whether the

“They’ve


pushed
their
neighbors
closer and
closer to
the U.S.
security
orbit.”
MALCOLM TURNBULL
Former Australian prime
minister
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