56 VIETNAM
PHOTOQUEST/GETTYIMAGESance of power. Nixon wanted to maintain his
reputation for toughness, extending back to
his days as an anti-communist in Congress,
because he believed it was crucial for getting
an honorable deal on Vietnam.
One thing that drove Kennedy’s policies
was his perception of his relationship with So-
viet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. From the
beginning, Kennedy felt he had to portray
toughness: “I have to show him that we can be
just as tough as he is. I’ll sit down with him
and let him see who he’s dealing with.”^
2WPV[WV JQWOZIXPMZ IVL NWZUMZ [\IЄMZ
Doris Kearns Goodwin, writes:I knew from the start, Johnson told me
in 1970, describing the early weeks of
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either way I moved. If I left the woman
I really loved—the Great Society—in or-
der to get involved in that bitch of a war
... I would lose everything. All my pro-
grams. All my hopes to feed the hungry
and shelter the homeless ... if I left the
war and let the Communists take over
South Vietnam, then I would be seen as
a coward and my nation would be seen
as an appeaser.With Nixon, there are multiple elements
at play, including his many years of public
service in a changing political landscape, his
grievances with the media,^ his symbiotic re-
lationship with that tower of self-assurance
Henry Kissinger, his psychology and ego,and his calculated strategy to appear a loose
cannon in order to force Hanoi and its pa-
trons in Moscow and Beijing to negotiate.
He told aide H.R. Haldeman: “I call it the
Madman Theory, Bob. I want the North Viet-
namese to believe I’ve reached the point
where I might do anything to stop the war.
We’ll just slip the word to them that, for
God’s sake, you know Nixon is obsessed
about Communism. We can’t restrain him when he’s angry—and he
has had his hand on the nuclear button—and Ho Chi Minh himself
will be in Paris in two days begging for peace.”Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and NixonQVÆ]MVKMLJa\PMLWU-
ino theory, believed they were acting with just cause by supporting
the self-defense of South Vietnam as well as the neutrality of Cambo-
dia and Laos in the context of superpower rivalry and communist
insurgency.
Three of the war aims they shared—contain communism, spread
democracy and demonstrate resolve to foreign audiences—are limit-
ed, yet robust national security objectives with moral credibility.
What about national honor? No one wants to think that our sons,
husbands, brothers and fathers died in vain at Hue, Khe Sanh and
Hamburger Hill.
The U.S. did not go to war to vindicate its national honor; honor
became a war aim that prolonged the war. Regardless of its psycho-
logical and emotional power, the concept of national honor is morally
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[]Q\WN^QK\WZaJ]\\W[QUXTaKWV\QV]M\PMÅOP\"¹VWKW[\\WWOZMI\º
The extreme view of national honor does not accord with the individ-
ualistic, democratic sentiments of the U.S. because it can become the
voice of Hitler and the kamikazes.
Nonetheless, a focus on honor can become a factor restraining
W\PMZ_IZIQU[?M_IV\XZM[QLMV\[IVLOMVMZIT[\W[Ia"?M_QTTÅOP\
hard to win. We’ll give your sons and daughters in uniform every tool
to be successful. We’ll care for them while in uniform and after they
KWUMPWUM)VL_MXZWUQ[MaW]\PI\QN\PMKITK]T][NWZÅOP\QVO\PQ[
war changes in some way, we will honor
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course. We won’t dishonor the dead by need-
lessly adding more to their numbers. That is
a formula for peace with honor.
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for glory does not mean that other war aims
are necessarily tainted, but personal ego can
PI^MPIZUN]TMЄMK\[WVLMKQ[QWV[JaLIUIO-
ing the relationships among senior leaders
MTMK\MLWЅKQIT[VW\\Z][\QVOUQTQ\IZaKWU-
manders), limiting the possibilities for diplo-
macy and distorting the policy possibilities.
During the Vietnam era, the conditions
Truman faced in Southeast Asia in the early
1950s evolved dynamically to the moments
when President Gerald R. Ford watched the
abandonment of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon
on his television set in 1975. The decisions
UILMIKZW[[XZM[QLMVKQM[\WÅOP\IVLXZW-
long the war had some sound strategic and
ethical foundations, and yet there are mor-
ally troubling aspects to the war. VNixon visits troops in
Vietnam in July 1969.
He said in 1973, “Let
us be proud of those
who...gave their lives
so that the people of
South Vietnam might
live in freedom.”Reproduced from
Just American Wars,
1st Edition by Eric,
Patterson, published
by Routledge. © Eric
Patterson, 2019,
reproduced by
arrangement with
Taylor & Francis
Books UK.