Bloomberg Businessweek Europe - 19.08.2019

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◼ POLITICS Bloomberg Businessweek August 19, 2019


35

THE BOTTOM LINE Protests against political oppression in
Moscow have so far withstood a police crackdown, but the effort
to end them is just a warmup for the Kremlin.

“If I go to the
next one, I
have to decide
for myself
whether I’m
ready to die”

protests interrupted his campaign for a third term in



  1. Then, his decision to return to the presidency
    combined with allegations of widespread fraud in
    parliamentary elections the previous December to
    set off a wave of anti-Kremlin actions that brought
    tens of thousands into the streets. The six-month
    opposition drive eventually wilted under pressure
    similar to that now being applied to demonstrators.
    Not long afterward, Putin’s approval ratings
    surged amid a patriotic wave inspired by the 2014
    annexation of Crimea from Ukraine, reaching highs
    of almost 90%. Last year, however, his popular-
    ity plummeted to 64% after he pushed legislation
    through the State Duma that increased the retire-
    ment age by five years, to 60 for women and 65 for
    men, which will cost the average Russian 900,000
    rubles ($13,800) in lost benefits.
    Incomes in Russia have fallen for five straight
    years because of the persistently low price of oil,
    Russia’s main export, and the grinding impact of
    U.S. and European Union sanctions imposed over
    Crimea. Simmering discontent has periodically
    boiled over into protests—not only in the politically
    energized capital but also in the heartland. The com-
    plaints tend to be about local issues such as plans to
    build a trash dump or low salaries for state workers,
    but anti-Kremlin slogans aren’t uncommon.
    “It’s all part of the reaction to the overall sense of
    injustice: the lies on television, the unfulfilled past
    promises,” says Sergei Belanovsky, a Moscow sociol-
    ogist who was among the few to predict major pro-
    tests in the 2011-12 political cycle. “The repressions
    will help [the government] in the short term,” he
    says, “but there will be more flare-ups all over.”
    In a few cases, the authorities have given in.
    Spontaneous demonstrations against plans to build
    a church on a popular park in the Urals city of
    Yekaterinburg this spring attracted the attention of
    Putin, who called for a local referendum on the idea.
    After voters rejected the plan for the church, author-
    ities dropped the idea.
    The stakes are higher for big national issues in the
    capital. While the Moscow City Council has limited
    power, the election is seen as a warm-up for parlia-
    mentary voting in 2021. Controlling that vote is crit-
    ical for the Kremlin as it looks for ways to ensure
    Putin’s rule extends beyond the end of his current
    term in 2024. Term limits prevent him from running
    for reelection, but top officials are already talking
    about constitutional changes as the deadline looms.
    Putin is leaning on his government to get the
    economy going by then. He’s hoping to revive the
    engine of his popularity in his first two terms: a
    steady rise in living standards. He’s laid out plans for
    a massive $400 billion spending program to boost


growth in the coming years, though even his own
officials aren’t sure it will work.
For the moment, Kremlin officials are confident
they can keep the lid on popular anger, combin-
ing targeted concessions and an extra-tough line
against unsanctioned demonstrations to keep the
unrest from festering. The harsh crackdown has the
added benefit for the Kremlin of saddling a number
of prominent opposition politicians with criminal
convictions, which, under Russian law, will bar them
from running for office in the next political cycle.
Authorities are looking into allegations of money
laundering at the anti-corruption foundation set up
by opposition leader Alexey Navalny—who’s sat out
most of this summer’s protests in jail—in an appar-
ent effort to crush a key resource for Kremlin critics.
State media have also blasted the protests as inspired
by Russia’s enemies in the West.
Turnout at the demonstration on Aug. 10—which
had been granted a permit by authorities—was as
high as 60,000, according to an independent count,
making it the largest since 2012. “Saturday’s protest
in Moscow, which definitely set a record for num-
bers for this time of year, won’t have any political
consequences,” says Konstantin Kostin, a former
Kremlin official who now heads a think tank that
works with the government. “Modern hybrid
regimes—democracy plus soft authoritarianism—
can easily deal with this kind of action. By repres-
sive means, of course, if the law is violated,” he adds.
Kostin may well be speaking with the overconfi-
dence of an insider in the hermetically sealed world
of the Kremlin elite. A late-July poll commissioned by
his group found 37% of Muscovites support the pro-
tests, while only 27% have a negative view of them.
The Sept. 8 city council vote is still weeks away, giv-
ing public anger room to grow.
Dubinin was released quickly after he was
detained, but he sat out the next week’s protest,
nursing his bruised head. He says he filed a com-
plaint against police and emergency workers who
ignored his appeals about the rough treatment. “If
they wanted to scare people, then they succeeded,”
he said soon after. “If I go to the next one, I have to
decide for myself whether I’m ready to die.”
On Aug. 10, however, he was back out on the
streets, and now says he’s overcome his fears of get-
ting hurt again. “Now I’ve decided that it’s wrong to
be scared. I’ll be going to all the demonstrations—
permitted and not—to stand up for my civil rights and
support those who were arrested.” �Irina Reznik
and Ilya Arkhipov, with Stepan Kravchenko
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